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Collateral damage presents a significant risk during air drops and airstrikes,
risking citizens’ lives and property, straining the relationship between the United
States Air Force and host nations. This dissertation presents a methodology to
determine the optimal location for making supply airdrops in order to minimize col-
lateral damage while maintaining a high likelihood of successful recovery. A series of
non-linear optimization algorithms are presented along with their relative success in
finding the optimal location in the airdrop problem. Additionally, we present a quick
algorithm for accurately creating the Pareto frontier in the multi-objective airstrike
problem. We demonstrate the effect of differing guidelines, damage functions, and
weapon employment selection which significantly alter the location of the optimal
aimpoint in this targeting problem. Finally, we have provided a framework for mak-
ing policy decisions in fast-moving troops-in-contact situations where observers are
unsure of the nature of possible enemy forces in both finite and infinite time horizon
problems. Through a recursive technique of solving this Markov decision process we
have demonstrated the effect of improved intelligence and differing weights in the
face of uncertain situations.
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Even as advances in weapons and intelligence gathering improve U.S. mili-
tary capabilites, civilian casualties and collateral damage continue to hurt the U.S.
mission in the Middle East. According to sources [98] [45], over 6,000 Afghan civil-
ians deaths can be attributed directly to U.S. and NATO military actions since the
inception of the Afghanistan campaign in 2001.
Specific to the USAF, in 2006, 116 Afghan civilians were killed as a result
of 13 separate OEF and ISAF bombing missions. In 2007, those numbers grew to
321 civilians in 22 bombings [38]. Aerial bombardment, which has long been the
centerpiece of the U.S. strategic plan in Afghanistan, has had a devastating impact
on Afghan civilians [55]. Some [90] argue that civilian casualties caused by American
troops and American bombs have made the case for the insurgency.
The issue of civilian casualties has become a focal point of strategic planning
for both NATO and the insurgency forces in Afghanistan. Civilian casualties often
are the result of insurgents hiding among civilians or using the civilians as human
shields, since they know American forces are hesitant to strike buildings in which
they believe civilians are located [63]; however, that does not stop insurgents from
using these incidents as rallying cries to coerce the Afghan populace. “The Taliban
and Al Qaeda grasp the value of presenting themselves as defenders of the Afghan
people. They distribute pamphlets in which they revile American and NATO soldiers
as infidel, terrorist forces of occupation. When those same forces send planes to bomb
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mosques and religious schools, killing Afghan children, the Taliban do not hesitate
to seize on the tragedy as proof of the validity of their propaganda - even if merciless
Al Qaeda interlopers prevented those children from escaping the bombs [96].”
In November 2008, General David McKiernan, commander of U. S. Forces
Afghanistan “ordered a tightening of procedures for launching airstrikes” while stat-
ing that “minimizing civilian casualties is crucial [103].” In June 2009, as his rela-
tionship with Defense Secretary Gates became strained due to the continued civilian
casualties [97], he was asked to resign. His replacement, General Stanley McChrystal,
in one of his first interviews upon taking the role stated, “A willingness to operate
in ways minimizing casualties or damage is critical. The measure of success will not
be enemy killed. It will be shielding the Afghan population from violence [1].” U.S.
commanders have even gone so far as requiring troops to withdraw when possible
rather than get into a protracted firefight that result in civilian casualties [39].
The issue of civilian casualties is not new to the U.S. military during the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT), but with increasing numbers of news outlets, social
media forums, and personal communication devices, any mistake can be immediately
consumed by people around the world, even before the facts of the scenario are
fully known. Studies on collateral damage estimation from nuclear weapons were
performed after World War II [88]. Kiernan and Owen [55] discuss the similarities
between GWOT and Cambodian civilian casualties during the Vietnam War. Keaney
[54] speaks of the intelligence issues concerning collateral damage from the Gulf
War. Infamously, during the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 2000, the U.S. military
mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade when believing the building to
be a headquarters for the Yugoslav Army [75]. Similar situations in Yugoslavia [7] [36]
had resulted in buildings which have little-to-no military value being destroyed.
Even with the most modern military technology and decades of war-time expe-
rience, civilian casualties continue to plague U.S. forces and undermine the mission
they seek to accomplish in the Global War on Terrorism.
2
1.2 Collateral Damage
The three papers presented in this dissertation explore the three categories of
collateral damage and techniques or tools within each category to lower the amount
of collateral risk while still achieving mission success. Chapter 2 develops a tool for
minimizing collateral risk from supply airdrops based on airdrop dynamics. Chap-
ter 3 provides a framework for understanding the trade-off between lethality on a
military target and the risk to collateral objects for pre-planned airstrike missions.
Chapter 4 develops guidelines for lowering civilian casualties in fast-moving troops-
in-contact scenarios where limited intelligence often yields poor decision-making.
1.2.1 Airdrop Collateral Damage. When typically thought of and reported
on, collateral damage applies to weapons fired near civilians and civilian buildings.
However, collateral damage also results from supply airdrops near populated areas.
These airdrops often need to occur near populated areas due to safety and logistic
concerns. The bundles, often weighing thousands of pounds and traveling at speeds
up to 20 miles per hour, become dangerous projectiles when falling near the civilian
populations. Buildings can be damaged and, in extreme cases, people have been
killed [47].
Improvements in technology for airdrop platforms have vastly improved the
potential accuracy of airdrop missions [5] [69]. However, the majority of airdrops
are still performed by “dumb” techniques, where the bundles are not guided to the
ground, but rather fall freely once exiting the back of the aircraft. These airdrop
missions can often yield unrecoverable bundles when they fall in places where recov-
ery is either impossible, such as in a lake or on a mountainside, or where recovery
is dangerous, such as when bundles land miles from an operating base in hostile
territory.
The official Airdrop Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology [100] notes
the art and science of airdrops, when put together with sound judgment and opera-
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tional considerations yield a successful drop. The guidance notes that probabilities,
empirical data, and historical observations all should be considered in the planning
stages of an airdrop [99]. The guidance instructs planners to ask themselves five ques-
tions regarding collateral damage during development and execution of an airdrop
plan:
• Are there collateral objects within the collateral hazard area of the intended
airdrop target?
• Can the functionality of the collateral objects be characterized?
• Can collateral concerns be mitigated by utilizing different parachutes/delivery
methods while still achieving the desired effect?
• Are there civilians at risk by the airdrop?
• Is the collateral risk of the airdrop excessive in comparison to the expected
advantage gained by the airdrop?
The collateral damage methodology presented in [100] develops an understand-
ing of airdrop dispersion, incidental consequences (collateral risk), and mitigation
techniques, but it is quick to point out that the methodology is not an exact sci-
ence. The Collateral Damage Weighted Risk Assessment Tool (CDWRAT) presented
in [100] uses a simple formula based on the size and location of collateral objects
and the circular error probable (CE90). The equation shown below yields an overall




+ 1)× Aco (1)
where
Rlong - CE90 semi-major radius
Rco - collateral object radius
AW - weighted collateral object area
4
Aco - original collateral object area
Figure 1: Current Collateral Damage Estimated Weighted Risk [99]
This calculation is performed for each collateral object and the results are
aggregated:





While this equation presents a good start in estimation of collateral risk from
airdrops, it does neglect a number of factors which affect proper estimation of col-
lateral risk. Cammarano [23] improves this equation by finding the true distribution
of airdrops, rather than simply the CE90. Based on operational drops, he argues
that airdrops can be estimated using the bivariate normal distribution. Further, his
estimation tool uses the bivariate normal distribution with the standard deviations
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in the x- and y-directions along with zero correlation between the x- and y-miss
distances (i.e. ρ = 0).
Further, Cammarano provides for weights being given to the collateral objects
to more accurately approximate real-world considerations. In the CDWRAT, the
example provided treats bodies of water and buildings of all types and purposes as
the same, with only the size and the distances to the center of the object taken
into consideration. Cammarano’s tool gives the planner the ability to say that while
landing a bundle into a lake and into a occupied building are both undesirable, at
least in the case of the lake, no one is injured, thus a higher weighting can be placed
on the building. While Cammarano’s work doesn’t (typically) yield a percentage of
collateral risk, it gives a much more meaningful statistic (overall collateral damage
expected) to the decision-maker.
Cammarano also allows for buildings of differing shapes, where the CDWRAT
only requires the center of the collateral object; this grants even more accuracy
to his methodology. Cammarano also incorporates multiple bundle drops from the
same mission, where each bundle has its own desired point of impact. Finally, Cam-
marano’s tool gives a report for each collateral object providing accurate information
to the decision-maker who might not want to assign weights to each of the collateral
objects.
The second chapter of this dissertation leverages off of Cammarano’s work.
Once we are able to understand the nature of airdrops and estimate the collateral
risk based upon relatively few inputs, the next question becomes: How do we then
minimize the expected amount of collateral risk for an airdrop?
1.2.2 Pre-Planned Airstrike Collateral Damage. Pre-planned airstrikes are
required to have a collateral damage estimation (CDE) done prior to engagement.
The overall purposes of this CDE is to lower the amount of collateral damage result-
ing from the strike and to make the decision-maker fully aware of the collateral risks
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prior to making the decision to strike. The U.S. military has developed software
which visually describes collateral risk in the area of the blast [43].
Much of the literature pertains to the blast effect of weapons on buildings,
structures and people. Ngo et al. [77] and Mays and Smith [67] discuss blast
effects on buildings, while Mills [71] and Newmark and Hansen [76] and a U.S.
Army [101] report concern themselves with structural design to resist collateral dam-
age. Humphrey et al. [49] discuss the effects of weapons on people within the blast
and fragmentation radius.
Damage functions to model effects within the blast radius have been devel-
oped to accurately represent collateral risk in an airstrike. Driels [34], in his work
on weaponeering, provides damage functions, and estimates of lethality on military
targets. Douglass [33] presents a method for estimating collateral damage in urban
environments based on the proximity of the friendly forces to the enemy combatants,
based on size of weapons, likelihood of false alarm, blast radius, and circular error
probable of weapon used. David [29] gave estimates of the safe distances in com-
bat scenarios for friendly forces based on circular error radius, the lethal ranges of
weapons, and the damage functions of these weapons. Lucas [64] tacked onto David’s
work by looking at the limiting behavior of damage functions relative to one another,
focusing primarily on four damage functions: the lognormal, exponential, Gaussian,
and cookie-cutter. Przemieniecki [82] discusses aspects of damage functions, accu-
racy functions, and collateral risk, as well as their effect on optimal aiming locations.
Binninger [14] presents a lognormal damage function for use in predicting the effect
of a nuclear weapon and by offsetting the aimpoint of the weapon can estimate the
percentage of buildings destroyed at a given distance from the center of a town.
There has been minimal work in viewing the airstrike problem as a multi-
criteria decision making model, most notably [57] and Brooks et al. [20] who used
agent-based simulation to explore the trade-off between building damage and mission
effectiveness. However, little has been done to develop the Pareto frontier within this
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framework to allow decision-makers the optimal aimpoints and employment methods
to minimize risk while maximizing lethality on a military target.
1.2.3 Troops-in-Contact Collateral Damage. The majority of civilians
killed in U.S. airstrikes died when Special Forces summoned an airstrike to sup-
port them during troops-in-contact (TICs) situations [39]. A TIC situation is an
unplanned opportunity strike in support of ground forces that have made contact
with enemy forces. In fact, only two (of 35) airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties
in 2007-08 were from non-TIC (pre-planned) missions [38]. These rapid-response,
fluid strikes are characterized by (typically) a lack of prior information concerning
the nature and location of enemy and non-combatant forces, as well as friendly forces
which may be in serious harm.
The ground forces in TIC situations, with the use of an Air Force JTAC,
will request air support in order to strike the enemy, or at least provide them the
opportunity to extricate themselves safely from the scene. The fog of war in the form
of limited intelligence is the reason that TICs produce so many casualties. When
friendly force lives are at stake, the air forces must act quickly and decisively, and
the consequence of these actions may be the loss of Afghan civilian lives.
TICs scenarios have been the least studied of the three collateral hazards pre-
sented in this dissertation, yet they present the most danger to civilians. The closest
information in the literature comes from other types of situations where quick de-
cisions need to be made with limited information. Kocher et al. [56] look at the
effects of time pressure on risky decisions and how pure loss and pure gain decision
models affect human decision making. Decision-making where delaying the decision
has an associated cost was studied by Payne et al. [79] where they found that in
some cases delaying decision making results in a lower expected return even when
the best decision is ultimately made.
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Polikar [81] looks at decision-making where intelligence is gathered from mul-
tiple participants with differing perspectives, ultimately arguing that these vary-
ing perspectives yield better decisions. More germane to the battlefield, Phillips
et al. [80] seek to model the flow of information in combat situations, a critical
component of TICs. They present an information processing model which allows
decision-makers to understand the best intelligence available.
The work presented here seeks to provide a framework for the issues and chal-
lenges which TICs present. The framework is a rough sketch of how information (the
key issue in TICs) flows in fast-moving scenarios. Within this framework, we will
seek to identify optimal decisions and optimal times to make these decisions during
these rapid-response situations.
1.3 Methodology Literature Review
The three different problems presented within this dissertation yield varying
formulations which touch on a variety of classes of operations research fields, in-
cluding non-linear programming, global search techniques, evolutionary algorithms,
multi-objective optimization, stochastic programming, and Markov decision pro-
cesses. The developed formulations and solution techniques are explored in the
following sections to give a background on which the three papers will be based.
1.3.1 Non-Linear Programming. Bazaraa et al. [11] formulate the non-
linear minimization program as:
min f(x) (3)
subject to gi(x) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m
hi(x) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , l
x ∈ X,
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where X is a subset of Rn. f is a function from Rn → R and is referred to as the
objective function. gj(x) ≤ 0 and hk(x) = 0 are the constraints. In a non-linear
program, the constraints and objective functions can be non-linear (whereas, in a
linear program, all constraint and objective functions are linear).
If f(x̂) ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ Rn, then x̂ is the global minimum for the function f
in the unconstrained problem. If there exists a neighborhood Nε(x̂) around x̂ where
f(x̂) ≤ f(x) for any x ∈ Nεx̂ then x̂ is a local minimum for f in Rn.
If f is differentiable at x̂, and if x̂ is a local minimum, then ∇f(x̂) = 0. Con-
versely, if f is differentiable at x̂ and there exists a vector d such that ∇f(x̂)td < 0,
then there exists a δ > 0 such that f(x̂ + λd) < f(x) for each λ ∈ (0, δ) (d is the
descent direction of f at x̂). The descent direction d represents a direction of im-
provement in an optimization problem that is used in most non-linear programming
optimization algorithms, such as response surface methodology [74].
Similarly, in the constrained problem, if f(x̂) ≤ f(x) for all x ∈ S where S is
the feasible region for the problem, then x̂ is the global minimum and if there exists
a neighborhood Nε(x̂) around x̂ where f(x̂) ≤ f(x) for any x ∈ Nεx̂ then x̂ is a local
minimum for f in S. With S as a non-empty set in Rn and x̂ ∈ S̄ then the cone of
feasible directions (D) of S at x̂ is
D = {d : d 6= 0, and x̄ + λd ∈ S for all λ ∈ (0, δ) for some δ > 0}.
The cone of improving directions F at x̄ of f is
F = {d : f(x̄ + λd) < f(x̄) for all λ ∈ (0, δ) for some δ > 0}.
If f is differentiable at x̄ ∈ S then x̄ is a local optimum only if F ∩ D = ∅. That
is, there exists no feasible, improving direction for f at x̄. The concepts of feasi-
ble and improving directions are integral to area search methods over continuous
(particularly, differentiable) objective functions.
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While Lasdon [61] presents algorithms and heuristics for global optimization of
large systems, Roy et al. [86] review commercially available packages for spreadsheet
optimization. Achetti and Schoen [6] in their survey of global optimization tech-
niques lump approaches into space-covering techniques, trajectory techniques (such
as response surface methodology) and random search techniques, finding that each
technique has its merit and no strategy is optimal without a priori information on
the objective function.
1.3.1.1 Random Search Techniques. A random search technique is
proposed by Solis and Wets [93] to find global minima in optimization problems
expanding on the work of Anderson [4], Rastrigin [84], and Karnopp [53]. Their
work is particularly useful in situations where function characteristics are difficult to
compute, when the response function is “bumpy”, when processing time is limited,
and when it is highly desirable to find a global minimum among a large number
of local minima. The assumption for the response function is that it is continuous,
since a discontinuous function could conceivably have a minimum at a discontinuous
point, which would be (nearly) impossible to find without an exhaustive search of
every point in the input space S. Thus, they search for the essential infimum α of
f on S which is defined as α = inf{t : v[x ∈ S|f(x) < t] > 0}, which is the set
of points that yield values close to the essential infimum α has non-zero v-measure,
meaning that the search is for a location where a set of points have a response less
than t and this set also must have an interior (consider the case where the global
minimum is at a discontinuous point x, for some t ≥ f(x) and r > 0 there exists no
neighborhood B(x; r) such that all points in B(x; r) have a response value less than
t).
Importantly, Solis and Wets note that any global search method must meet
the assumption that for any Borel subset A of S with v(A) > 0, we have that∏∞
k=0[1−µk(A)] = 0. In essence, this means that any subset A (with volume) of the
search space S must be searched to guarantee that the global minimum is found.
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The Solis and Wets algorithm uses normally-distributed steps to generate new
points, the response value of the point is calculated and if the newly generated point
has a higher (worse) objective function value, then steps are taken from the initial
point in the opposite direction to find a new point. If both of these new points
are worse than the original point then a new starting point is generated. Hart [44]
notes that the Solis and Wets algorithm lacks definitive stopping criteria that yield
optimality, typically relying on a fixed number of iterations. Additionally, Hart
states, “In general, methods that utilize a priori information about a problem will
outperform general purpose methods that utilize less information [44].”
Niederreiter [78] presents quasi-Monte Carlo methods for generating a sequence
of uniformly distributed random points spread on a space. Estimates, using the
variance of these random points, can be made for the value of the minima over the
searched area and local search methods can be used in conjunction with these quasi-
Monte Carlo techniques; however, global minimization again cannot be guaranteed
on an objective function and domain without a priori information.
1.3.1.2 Response Surface Methodology. Anderson [4] discusses exper-
imental design and response surface methods to find input parameters for optimal
performance in an uncharacterized experiment. Brooks [21] compares steepest as-
cent and univariate iterative methods for determining the optimal settings during
experimentation, finding the ascent methods superior in terms of accuracy and speed.
A basic approach for approximating response functions is proposed by Myers
and Montgomery [74] with y = f(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) + ε where f is the true response
function, which is either unknown or complicated. ε in the function for this work
will represent sources of variation that are not accounted for by the derived model.
ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk will be the input values for our model; in the airdrop model these will
typically be the aimpoint (x and y) and the approach angle.
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Myers and Montgomery discuss further the sequential nature of response sur-
face methodology whereby initially hypotheses regarding the important input vari-
ables takes place, often backed up with a screening experiment. The screening exper-
iment will identify the variables affecting the response variable and which variables’
effects should be investigated further. After the screening takes place, they recom-
mend the use of a first-order model and the method of steepest ascent, whereby
starting from an initially small portion (referred to by Myers and Montgomery as
the region of interest) of the overall search space, we begin to move in the direction
of the optimal combination of input variables. Iteratively this method of steepest
ascent is performed until a maximum for the response function is found (once the
current solution can no longer be improved in the local area (region of interest)).
Critically, it should be noted that the maximum found by this technique is simply
a local maximum for the response function and is not guaranteed to be a global
maximum. Situations arise where the response surface will be “bumpy” and have
many local maxima throughout the total search space; thus while the techniques of
Myers and Montgomery will be used, they must be extended in the effort to find a
global maximum.
1.3.2 Evolutionary Algorithms. Hart [44] inspected genetic algorithms in
combination with local search algorithms for solving global optimization problems.
Michalewicz and Schoenauer [70] discuss adapting evolutionary algorithms to con-
strained parameter optimization problems, pointing out that finding a general algo-
rithm that is optimal for all non-linear programs is unrealistic. The existence of local
(and not global) optima presents the primary problem in non-linear programs with
continuous functions, since steepest descent algorithms will yield only local (and not
necessarily global) optima. Michalewicz and Schoenauer break down evolutionary
algorithms into mutation operators, such as [10], [78] and [37], and crossover opera-
tors, as in [87], [35], [30] and later [94]. Mutation operators typically use Gaussian
mutation to modify components of a solution vector, whereas crossover operators
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use multiple parent solution vectors to develop future generations of solution vec-
tors. In both cases, the algorithms remove less-optimal solutions in each proceeding
generation. Further, [70] views the constraint-handling methods as falling into four
categories: feasibility preserving, penalty-based, feasibility/infeasibility separated,
and hybrid methods.
Storn and Price [94] developed the differential evolution technique for solv-
ing global optimization problems. Their algorithm, discussed in much more detail
in the following chapter, inspired a great deal of effort in the realm of optimiza-
tion. Lampinen and Zelinka [59] apply the differential evolution algorithm to mixed
integer-discrete-continuous problem demonstrating the versatility of the algorithm.
Similar to what [70] presented for the general non-linear programming algorithm,
Lampinen [58] presents a constraint-handling approach for the constrained differen-
tial evolution algorithm. Huang et al. [48] demonstrate a self-adaptive algorithm for
constrained non-linear problems which modifies the two control parameters (F and
CR) of differential evolution, thus cutting out the need for exhaustive parameter
fine-tuning.
1.3.3 Multi-Objective Optimization. Multi-objective optimization is ap-
plied in cases where there is more than one objective function.
min y = f(x) = (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fn(x)) (4)
subject to x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ X
y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Y
where x is the solution vector, X is the solution space, y is the objective vector,
and Y is the objective space [107]. With more than one objective function, there
becomes no strict ordering in the objective space (unlike in a single-objective prob-
lem). Therefore, the Pareto frontier concept is implemented, where we say that a
solution x̂ is non-dominated if there exists no other x such that fk(x) ≤ fk(x̂) for
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all k = 1, . . . , n and fk(x) < fk(x̂) for some k ∈ 1, . . . , n. The collection of such
non-dominated (Pareto-optimal) points forms the Pareto frontier for the formulation.
Techniques to solve multi-objective formulations attempt to find solutions near
the Pareto frontier. However, since the Pareto-frontier is not a single point (typically)
nor a finite collection of points (typically for continuous solution spaces), then finding
solutions near the true Pareto frontier is not enough. Multi-objective algorithms also
seek to find a variety of solutions that describe the Pareto-frontier more completely.
Ziztler et al. [106] provide three metrics which describe the performance of multi-
objective algorithms; these metrics are based on accuracy of the solutions, diversity
of solutions, and breadth of solutions in creating the Pareto-frontier.
Evolutionary algorithms have been found to be particularly robust in develop-
ing the Pareto frontier for multi-objective problems due to their ability to process
a set of solutions in parallel, therefore exploiting similarities of solutions by recom-
bination [107]. Ziztler and Thiele [107] developed a strength Pareto evolutionary
algorithm approach (SPEA) which stored nondominated solutions externally in a
second group, evaluated solution fitness dependent on the number of external non-
dominated points which dominate it, and clustered the nondominated point set in
order to lower the nondominated set’s population without losing diversity.
Babu and Jehan [9] implemented the work of Storn and Price [94] into the
multi-objective realm by iteratively expelling dominated solutions for each genera-
tion. Xue et al. [104] present another differential evolution based algorithm (MODE)
where non-dominated solutions are identified at every generation with the mutation
step being different for non-dominated and dominated points. A Pareto-frontier
differential evolution (PDE) is presented by Abbass et al. [2] which is seen to im-
prove upon the SPEA approach of [107], with their approach constantly finding new
non-dominated points in each generation and then removing similar ones based on
a distance metric.
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1.3.4 Dynamic Programming. Dynamic programming can be thought of
using stages and states. A stage is a discrete point in time at which a decision (uk) is
made based on the state (xk) of the system. The state is the summary of all decisions
from previous stages and their outcomes, due not only to the decisions made but
also the randomness (wk) involved with moving from stage to stage. Some additive
reward is gained for each decision made, and the goal is to maximize the sum of the
rewards over the time horizon of the problem.
Bertsekas [13] lays out the main ingredients of a basic dynamic programming
formulation as:
1. A discrete-time system of the form xk+1 = fk(xk, uk, wk)
2. Independent random parameters
3. A control constraint (decision)
4. An additive cost of the form EgN(xN) +
∑N−1
k=0 gk(xk, uk, wk)
5. Optimization over policies (rules for choosing uk for each k and each possible
value for xk).
Denardo [31] formulates the dynamic programming problem as:
xk+1 = fk(xk, uk, wk), k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (5)
where:
k indexes discrete time,
xk is the state of the system and summarizes past information that is relevant for
future optimization
uk is the control or decision variable to be selected at time k
wk is a random parameter
N is the number of time control is applied.
For the LLS problem, we assume that each stage brings about more data about
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the problem assuming the pilot continues to loiter. The rewards in this model are
typically assumed to be costs, either the cost of a “look” decision or the likelihood of
being incorrect given a “leave” or “shoot” decision. Ahner [3] applied approximate
dynamic programming techniques to optimize control of unmanned aerial vehicles in
combat situations.
1.3.5 Stochastic Programming. Avriel and Williams [8] derive the expected
value of information in recourse problems and show the value of a wait-and-see
approach versus a recourse method. The difference between them is that in a recourse
problem, a decision is made, then a random variable is observed, and then a recourse
to a contingency plan is determined. A wait-and-see approach supposes that one
could see what the random variable is before one makes an initial decision, and
maximize our initial decision based on the known data rather than the unknown
random variable. Certainly, the expected profit from the wait-and-see approach must
be at least as great as in the recourse problem case. Then they pose a suggestion
that if they could purchase the perfect information, how much should they pay
for perfect information? EV PI = WS − RP yields the expected value of perfect
information. Avriel and Williams prove that EV PI ≥ 0 given that an expected
value of the random variable and the indicated maxima exist. Further, they show
that 0 ≤ EV PI ≤ EV − RP . EVPI can be applied to stochastic linear problems
with recourse and more general stochastic programs including those with quadratic
recourse.
1.3.5.1 Two-Stage Stochastic Linear Program. Kall and Wallace [51]
formulate the two-stage stochastic linear program as:
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min cTx+Q(x) (6)





and Q(x, ξ) = min{q(ξ)Ty|W (ξ)y = h(ξ)− T (ξ)x, y ≥ 0},
where pj is the probability that ξ̃ = ξj, the jth realization of ξ̃, h(ξ) = h0 + Hξ =
h0 +
∑
i hiξi, T (ξ) = T0 +
∑
i Tiξi and q(ξ) = q0 +
∑
i qiξi.
Higle and Sen [46] present an algorithm for two-stage linear programs with
recourse that leverages off of Benders’ decomposition whereby they randomly gener-
ate observations of random variables to construct statisical estimates of supports of
the objective function. Gassmann [40] presents a computer code for the multistage
stochastic linear programming problem that uses an implementation of a nested
decomposition algorithm.
Interior point methods are also considered by Birge and Holmes [16], Lustig, et
al. [65], and Dantzig and Madansky [28]. Birge and Qi [17] are credited with applying
Karmarkar’s [52] interior-point method to stochastic programming. They formulate
the stochastic linear program with recourse (and discrete random variables) as:
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min cTx0 +Q(x0) (7)







and for each i = 1, . . . , N,
the recourse cost Q(x0, ξi) is obtained by solving the recourse problem:
Q(x0, ξi) = inf{qiy|Wy = hi − T ix, y ∈ Rni+},
ξi = (qi, hi, T i),
pi = prob [ξ(ω) = ξ
i].





subject to A0x0 = b0
Aix0 +Wixi = bi, i = 1, . . . , N,
xi ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . , N
where xi ∈ Rni , i = 0, . . . , N,
bi ∈ Rmi , i = 0, . . . , N,
where mi ≤ ni, i = 0, . . . , N
and A0,Wi have full row rank.
By substituting the expressions for Q into the stochastic formulation a linear pro-
gramming formulation is created with W = Wi, T
i = Ai, and piq
i = ci for i =
1, . . . , N . The resulting problem has n = n0 + Nn1 variables and m = m0 + Nm1
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constraints. As Birge and Qi point out, methods for solving the linear formula-
tion include Van Slyke and Wet’s L-shaped method [102], Dantzig and Mandansky’s
decomposition method [28], and the basis factorization method proposed by Straz-
icky [95]. The L-shaped method solves the primal problem, while the decomposition
and factorization methods solve the dual formulation.
Lustig et al. [65] base their work on scenario analysis, where a few realizations
of the stochastic parameters are representative of the space of possible parameter
outcomes. For a two-stage model, the size of the optimization problem grows linearly
and typically, due to the size, decomposition methods are used. They point out
that interior point methods make solving these large resulting models feasible. They
implemented a primal-dual interior point method similar to the one described earlier,
in which they show that the primal-dual method performs significantly better than
Birge and Qi’s [17] dual block angular approach. Additionally, they propose a partial
splitting method which, due to the sparsity of the A matrices, speeds up the interior
point methods considerably.
Birge and Holmes [16] formulated a dual affine algorithm starting with a
dual feasible interior point, noting that the vast majority of the computational ef-
fort required is to calculate a solution to the symmetric positive definite system
(AD2AT )dy = b) or to calculate a factorization of the matrix that will enable quick
solution of the system. Further, Blomvall and Lindberg [18] present Riccati-based
primal interior point solver for multistage stochastic programming.
Birge and Holmes [15] also present a paper on the motivation for use of interior
point methods for solving two-stage stochastic linear programs with fixed recourse
along with characteristics of interior point solving methods. Additionally, they note
that the size of stochastic linear programs can become extremely large due to the
number of permutations of the unknown variables, and thus they present methods
for speeding up the interior point methods, including reformulation of the program,
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transpose product factorization, and factorization of the dual block angular pro-
grams.
1.3.6 Markov Decision Process. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a
problem in which there is a decision maker, a finite number of policies or choices
the decision maker can choose, a transition probability matrix which defines the
likelihood of the next state given the current state and policy, a transition reward
matrix which indicates the current reward gained for the state and policy, and a
performance metric based on the rewards gained during the stages of the MDP [42].
S, a finite state space of possible system states. A realization of the random variable
S is denoted by s.
A, a finite set of actions. A realization of the random variable A is denoted by a.
An action a causes transitions from the current state to some new state.
T : S×A×S → R[0,1] is the state-transition function, giving the probability that the
agent transit to state s′ when it is in state s and takes action a. In other words, the
transitions specify how each of the actions and exogenous events change the state of




′|a, s) = 1.
R : S ×A→ R is the reward function giving the expected immediate reward gained
by the agent for taking each action in each state.
Markov decision process applied to patient throughput in hospitals was re-
searched by Broyles [22], while Qiu and Pedram [83] looked at the Markov decision
process for continuous-time decision-making.
1.3.7 Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process. When the agent is
unsure of the state s that he is currently in, unlike the MDP where the agent knows
where he is at all times, this problem becomes a partially-observable Markov decision
process (POMDP). There is some probability distribution around the state in which
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the agent thinks he is in (the belief state b). McAllister [68] looked at optimal
planning with imperfect information, such as what U.S. troops have on battlefields.
O : S×A→ Π(Ω) is the observation function, which gives, for each action and
resulting state, a probability distribution over all possible observations (we write
O(s′, a, o) for the probability of making observation o given that the agent took
action a and landed in state s′).
Monahan [72] introduces a system where one of three decisions may be made.
Either the observer can “inspect” - attempt to observe the true state of the target
another time (at a cost), “stop” - make a determination as to the true state of the
target and have no option for further observation, or “continue” in which he moves
to the next time interval (at a cost) where the same three options will again be
available to him. In the next time interval there is some probability that the nature
of the target has changed which is a difference from the assumptions in this paper.
Monahan concluded, “While the Markovian property does not hold for the state of
the system, it does hold for the belief state of the system. The optimal policy for
any given stage is only dependent on the current belief state and not decisions made
in previous stages.”
Monahan [73] later looked at the applications and theory behind partially
observable MDPs. Kaelbling et al. [50] and Smallwood and Sondik [92] looked at
optimal decision policies in partially observable MDPs. Yost and Washburn [105]
applied linear programming techniques for decision making within POMDPs.
1.4 Overview of Literature Review
The following figures provide an overview of the topics covered and method-
ologies implemented in the following chapters.
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Figure 2: Motivation and Background Literature Review Summary
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Figure 3: Methodology Literature Review Summary
1.5 Description of Research
This dissertation first seeks to understand the nature of both airdrops and
airstrikes in terms of the parameters and distributions that accurately represent
all aspects of these missions. Once the parameters are understood, a formulation
for each of these problems is sought. Optimization techniques and algorithms will
then be created to minimize collateral risk while adhering to mission and logistical
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constraints. Finally, sensitivity analysis along with lessons-learned will be presented
to provide take-aways for mission planners acting in these environments under strict
time and mission requirements.
1.6 Statement of Original Contribution
This dissertation seeks to fill in gaps in both the literature and the methodology
by which the USAF estimates and minimizes collateral risk. The major contributions
presented in the following three chapters are:
• Characterization of airdrop distribution based on real-world data.
• Formulation of the collateral damage problem.
• Comparison of non-linear programming algorithms for solving the airdrop col-
lateral damage minimization problem.
• Algorithm for quickly finding optimal airdrop parameters based on a surrogate
function for the bivariate normal distribution.
• Multi-objective formulation for the airstrike collateral damage problem.
• Algorithm for finding Pareto optimal solutions for the airstrike problem.
• Quantitative comparison of damage functions for use in estimating collateral
risk.
• Quantitative comparison of weapon employment guidelines in the collateral
airstrike problem.
• Formulation of limited intelligence airstrike problem.
• Quantitative comparison of effects of weighting and a priori intelligence on
optimal firing policy.
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II. Minimizing Supply Airdrop Collateral Damage Risk
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Introduction. Supply airdrops occur for a variety of reasons. Supplies
are airdropped to scientists at the South Pole, Humvees to American troops at
forward operating bases in the mountains of Afghanistan, and food and water to
Haitians in the days after their devastating 2010 earthquake.
The necessity of airdrops as part of emergency disaster relief is underscored
in [91], [27], [62]. Shortly after the 2010 Haitian earthquakes, for example, United
States Air Force (USAF) planes were dropping over 200 water and food bundles per
day outside Port-au-Prince [24] from 100 daily flights [66]. Bottlenecks on the roads
in Haiti along with the blockage of the seaport prevented the movement of critical
supplies, forcing the primary source of aid to be airdrops into secured areas [66].
The airdropped supplies helped minimize widespread violence and looting in the
days following the earthquake.
Supply airdrops are typically used in cases where plane landings are either
unsafe or inefficient. In the first four months of 2011, the USAF dropped 25 million
pounds of supplies for troops and locals in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was not pos-
sible by truck. Supply airdrops constitute a vital tactical piece of both war-fighting
and peacekeeping missions for the USAF throughout the world and consequently the
USAF has developed expertise potentially useful to other supply airdrop agencies.
Airdrops allow ground units to operate in areas that are not tied to ground logistical
resupply. Aerial resupply allows the freedom of movement without worrying about
convoys and their large logistical footprint. [60]
Supply airdrops have risks beyond those of the equipment and personnel in-
volved. A recent challenge.gov request [26] underscored the danger that comes with
dropping humanitarian food and water supplies over populated areas (where they
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may be in highest demand) and the need to develop alternative methods of per-
forming such drops. With the uncertain flight paths of airdrops, along with their
weight (up to thousands of pounds), airdrops are particularly dangerous ventures
when occurring even in sparsely-populated areas. Poorly planned or executed air-
drops can result in lost, ruined, or stolen cargo and, more importantly, collateral
damage to the people and buildings near the drop zone. This is compounded by
the fact that an airdrop is typically not a single object - rather a series of objects
referred to as a bundle. This article develops a new technique for estimating risk of
collateral damage associated with supply airdrops and an efficient method for finding
the optimal aimpoint and approach direction for supply missions so as to minimize
collateral damage. We demonstrate, based on real-world drop data, that only an
estimate of the standard deviations in the x- and y- directions, with respect to flight
path, is required to estimate the expected risk of collateral damage during a supply
mission. The standard deviation parameters fit a bivariate normal distribution that
characterizes the error of a drop. Risk of damage is estimated by integrating the
bivariate normal distribution over the areas of undesirable landing locations in the
drop zone for each object in the supply bundle dropped.
Once an estimate of collateral damage risk is established, the goal becomes to
find the aimpoint and flight approach angle which minimize collateral damage yet
result in a drop as close to the recipients as possible. We must also accommodate the
reality that different elements in the scene may have different values of avoidance (e.g.
an occupied building versus a lake). The nature of this search is highly non-linear
because:
• of the shape of the bivariate normal distribution,
• each object in the bundle has its own drop error distribution, and
• each element in the scene has its unique location, shape, size, and value.
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To develop an effective global search technique for this problem, response sur-
face methodology (RSM), differential evolution (DE), and random search (RS) meth-
ods are compared and combined in this paper to provide quick and effective tools for
finding this optimal solution. The best search algorithm will be shown to be orders
of magnitude faster than enumeration and up to 20% more accurate than the use of
maps and the naked eye.
2.1.2 Nature of Airdrops. Airdrop accuracy has been an ever-present chal-
lenge to airdrop supply planners since the early days of resupply via aircraft airdrop.
Techniques such as high-velocity airdrops for rugged cargo minimize the effects of
wind on airdrop trajectory and maintain accuracy while allowing for higher release
altitudes and increased aircraft survivability. “Reefing” is an airdrop beginning de-
scent at high velocity for target accuracy and then switching to low velocity in
mid-descent. This allows aircraft to drop cargo from higher altitudes with the accu-
racy of a lower altitude drop. Many of these techniques and technologies were born
out of operational necessity and can be used in combination with different chute and
aircraft types.
One of the most successful recent examples of accuracy improvement is the
Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS). JPADS uses a steerable parachute and an
airborne guidance unit to control the cargo’s descent and guide it to its desired point
of impact [69]. JPADS offers many advantages over traditional airdrops: increased
accuracy, reduced drop zone size requirements, standoff cargo release, improved air-
craft survivability, and immediate feedback on airdrop accuracy [12]. A disadvantage
of JPADS is its cost relative to traditional “dumb” airdrops (which, by the way, com-
prise the majority of supply airdrops). In order to keep costs down recovering and
reusing retrograde airdrop items is necessary, though not always feasible [12]. The
challenge is that an agency providing supply airdrop support may not have the bud-
get or access to the best techniques and may need to do the best they can with
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the equipment they have. This is a main motivation for the development of our
methodology.
Regardless of drop technology used, planners must choose carefully where to
target. If a drop is too far from the point of use, recovery personnel could be exposed
to hazard and delay in getting relief to the recipients. If it is too close to ground
personnel or collateral objects, then the consequences of cargo weighing several tons
traveling at speeds of over 50 feet per second are unacceptable. How do mission
planners know how close is too close? What is the chance that the cargo will impact
a collateral object inside the drop zone?
Airdrop errors occur when an airdrop does not land at its intended point of
impact. These errors are commonly described as a distance from the drop target and
an angle with respect to the drop zone axis or by (x, y) coordinates. These errors
can be caused by problems with the computed air release point, flight path error,
drop crew error, drop zone elevations, cargo ballistics, load weight, or unpredicted
winds. While the calculation of a release point takes into account many factors
(summarized graphically in Figure 4) to determine the correct location in the air
to release an airdrop from the aircraft, individual drops are always subject to drop
error. In the next section, we characterize those errors probabilistically.
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Figure 4: Drop Zone Planning Diagram [99]
2.1.3 Bivariate Normal Distribution of Airdropped Bundles. We find that,
under a wide range of drop conditions and technologies, the drop errors from supply
bundles fit the bivariate normal distribution. The data set we studied was provided
by the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC). It is actual (as opposed to practice
run) data from over 700 airdrops in the field. Figure 5 shows a plot of all of the
data. It is not GPS data. You can almost imagine the ground spotter radioing that
a particular drop was “50 meters long at your 2 o’clock”. The data set has unique
characteristics which we studied at length. For more detail on that analysis, see [23].
Our main findings follow.
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Figure 5: Airdrop Scatter
We find that the mean errors in both the x and y direction are statistically
zero. On average (and this result remained when we parse the data into different
technologies and conditions), the planners hit where they aimed. However, there is
substantial variation. Further, the x and y directional errors have different standard
deviations. This makes sense because typically the timing of an airdrop affects the
y direction whereas wind has the majority of the effect on the x miss distance. We
also find that drop errors in the x-dimension are uncorrelated from those in the
y-dimension (i.e. ρ = 0) which makes risk calculations using the bivariate normal
distribution simpler, but if ρ 6= 0 then the same algorithms would be used; run time
would simply be longer.
It is worth stopping here to consider the implication of these findings to an
airdrop planner. The only data necessary to characterize the errors in a supply drop
are the standard deviations in the x and y directions for the equipment being used
in a particular drop zone. This can be accomplished with relatively few data points
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after making relatively few flights. Practice drops could even be done away from the
drop site to assess accuracy.
As an example, we can characterize the types of supply airdrops that AMC
made in our data set. The standard deviations for combinations of chute type and
airdrop altitude are summarized in Figure 6, along with the number of data points
collected for each combination. We find that the chute type and the airdrop altitude
have a statistically significant effect on the error distribution patterns, but not the
aircraft type. An AMC planner merely looks up a value pair from the right two
columns of the figure to characterize fully the shape of the risks of their drops.
Figure 6: Standard Deviation Table
To give the reader a sense of what the risk profiles look like, Figure 7 depicts
the density function for seven individual objects in a bundle airdrop mission. The
distance (five units) between the elements is found by multiplying the aircraft speed
at drop by the time interval between releases. Figure 7 shows the effect of increasing
standard deviation. When the standard deviation of the drop objects is low, their
individual probability distributions can be easily identified as multiple modes. On the
other hand, with a small separation distance relative to the standard deviations, the
graph becomes smoother and the bundle drop error profile approaches unimodality.
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Figure 7: Example Multiple Bivariate Normal Distributions
(d = 5, n = 7, σx = σy = 1, 5, 10)
One of these bundle shapes, dropped into the landing scene, is how we char-
acterize collateral damage risk. Numerically, we integrate the compound bivariate
normal distribution over the undesirable landing areas. In the next section, we begin
the development of an optimal location algorithm based on bivariate bundle risks.
2.2 Classes of Applicable Global Search Algorithms
It is not obvious how to design an optimum-seeking algorithm for this problem.
It is one of the contributions of this paper. In this section, we introduce several
important candidate global search algorithms.
2.2.1 Random Search. Random search technique is proposed by Solis and
Wets [93] to find global minima in optimization problems expanding on the work
of Anderson [4], Rastrigin [84] and Karnopp [53]. The Solis and Wets algorithm
uses normally distributed steps to generate new points, the response value of the
point is calculated and if the newly generated point has a higher (worse) objective
function value, then steps are taken from the initial point in the opposite direction
to find a new point. If both of these new points are worse than the original point
then a new starting point is generated. Hart [44] notes that the Solis and Wets
algorithm lacks definitive stopping criteria that yield optimality, typically relying on
a fixed number of iterations. However, their work is particularly useful in situations
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where function characteristics are difficult to compute, when the response function
is “bumpy”, when processing time is limited, or when it is highly desirable to find
a global minimum among a large number of local minima. The assumption for
the response function is that it is continuous, since a discontinuous function could
conceivably have a minimum at a discontinuous point, which would be (nearly)
impossible to find without an exhaustive search of every point in the input space. All
of these characteristics are exactly the conditions of the collateral damage problem
assuming bivariate normally distributed bundle drops.
Niederreiter [78] presents quasi-Monte Carlo methods for generating a sequence
of uniformly distributed random points spread on a space. Estimates, using the
variance of these random points, can be made for the value of the minima over
the searched area and local search methods can be used in conjunction with these
quasi-Monte Carlo techniques, however, global minimization cannot be guaranteed
on an objective function and domain without a priori information. Hart [44] notes
importantly: “In general, methods that utilize a priori information about a problem
will outperform general purpose methods that utilize less information.” For example,
a method to specifically find minima for the bivariate normal problem could use
random search, but take advantage of solving a more specific problem than a general
search or general algorithm is made to solve.
2.2.2 Response Surface Methodology. Another important basic approach
for approximating response functions is proposed by Myers and Montgomery [74]
with y = f(ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) + ε where f is the true response function, which is either
unknown or complicated. ε in the function for this work will represent sources of
variation that are not accounted for by the derived model. ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk will be the
input values for our model; in the airdrop model these are the aimpoint (x, y) and
the approach angle.
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Myers and Montgomery further discuss the sequential nature of response sur-
face methodology whereby initial hypotheses regarding the important input variables
take place, often backed up by a screening experiment. The screening experiment
identifies the variables affecting the response variable and which variables’ effects
should be investigated further. After screening takes place, they recommend the
use of a first-order model and the method of steepest descent, where starting from
an initially small portion (referred to by Myers and Montgomery as the region of
interest) of the overall search space, the user begins to move in the direction of the
optimal combination of input variables. Iteratively this method of steepest descent
is performed until a minimum for the response function is found in the local region
of interest. It should be noted that the minimum found by this technique is simply
a local minimum for the response function and is not guaranteed to be global.
In each local area of the drop scene, we need to find a local minimum if we
desire to obtain the global minimum. Therefore, we will consider the response sur-
face methodology of Myers and Montgomery. Specifically, when the random search
produces top candidates we will use RSM to improve the local solutions.
2.2.3 Differential Evolution. Storn and Price [94] present the differential
evolution heuristic for global optimization over continuous spaces, sometimes referred
to generically as genetic algorithms. Differential evolution does not rely on the cost
function to be differentiable or even continuous. The airdrop problem presents a con-
tinuous cost function, but one where the differentiation of the cost functions has no
closed-form solution. Differential evolution is a parallel direct search method which
utilizes D-dimensional (in the airdrop problem, 3-dimensional) parameter vectors as
a population for each generation G. The initial group of vectors is chosen randomly
and will cover the entire parameter space. DE generates new parameter vectors by
adding the weighted difference between two population vectors to a third vector in
a process called mutation. The mutated vector is then mixed with another prede-
termined “target” vector to yield the “trial” vector. The objective function value of
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the “trial” vector is compared to that of the “target” vector. In the selection step,
whichever vector has the lower function value will be the “target” vector for the
next generation. Each generation of vectors makes improvement in the cost function
value, and the mutations help prevent getting trapped in local minima. Addition-
ally, keeping DE vectors for each generation prevents trapping in the local minima.
The baseline model of Storn and Price is DE/rand/1/bin meaning that the initial
vectors are randomly chosen, there is one difference vector, and the crossover scheme
is binary distributed.
For constrained differential evolution, constraints are dealt with by the inser-
tion of a boundary penalty into the objective function [94]. Michalewicz and Schoe-
nauer [70] note that the methods for dealing with constraints in a genetic algorithm
can be handled in four ways:
• methods which preserve feasibility of the solutions,
• methods which use penalty functions, such as Storn and Price [94],
• methods which make distinctions between feasible and infeasible solutions, and
• hybrid methods.
Lampinen [58] discusses the laborious and difficult nature of the selection of
penalty parameters, and proposes a method that either preserves feasibility (if the
previous generation’s solution was feasible), moves towards feasibility (if both the
current and previous generations’ solutions are infeasible), or moves towards opti-
mality (if both generations’ solutions are feasible). The Lampinen approach doesn’t
rely upon starting solutions which are feasible. For the use of differential evolution
in the airdrop problem disallowing solutions that fall outside of the feasible region
would also be acceptable since the differential evolution method will not select these
disallowed solutions in the “selection” step of the algorithm. Michalewicz and Schoe-
nauer would classify this approach as a method which makes “distinctions between
feasible and infeasible solutions.”
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This approach appears to have merit. The airdrop problem does not have
overly complex constraints that preclude the easy generation of multiple, feasible
starting solutions, and the objective function is not differential - both properties
well served by evolutionary approaches.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Formulation of Optimal Supply Airdrop Location. Assuming a bi-
































subject to θmin ≤ θ̂ ≤ θmax (if desired)
xmin ≤ x̂ ≤ xmax
ymin ≤ ŷ ≤ ymax
where m is the number of collateral objects
x̂i = x̂+ s(i− 1) sin θ̂
ŷi = ŷ + s(i− 1) cos θ̂
vj - value of the j
th collateral object
x̂i - longitude of the aimpoint of the i
th bundle
ŷi - latitude of the aimpoint of the i
th bundle
θ̂ - approach angle
σx - horizontal miss distance standard deviation
σy - vertical miss distance standard deviation
n - number of objects in the airdrop bundle
s - distance of separation of the objects in the airdrop
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An important part of the formulation is that likelihoods of individual collateral
objects being struck must be modified to account for the possibility of multiple hits.
The overall probability of a hit is found by 1−
∏n
i−1(1−pi) where pi is the likelihood
of an individual airdropped object striking a specific collateral object. The value of
the collateral objects - that is the value of avoiding them - can be set to any positive
value; if they are to be treated equally then they are all set to 1. The solution to our
formulation is the aimpoint and approach angle which minimizes the total collateral
value of the bundles striking collateral objects, which is different than choosing the
aimpoint and angle which have the lowest likelihood of striking any collateral objects.
A final constraint is added to avoid unbounded solutions which occur any-
where outside the scene or potentially at the edge of the scene, because there is no
collateral damage to be avoided there. Based on our experience, we allow solutions
which produce only airdrops in which the middle of the bundle lands no closer than
two grid lines from the boundary of the scene. Remember, however, this does not
guarantee that all the objects in a bundle will actually land within the scene due to
the uncertainty of the bundle flight paths.
In the following section we introduce a base problem, motivated by a real-world
airdrop supply scene. It is intended to make concrete what we are doing and be the
starting point to develop test problems for the specific algorithms we will develop
and compare next.
2.3.2 A Drop Zone Problem Solved. Our drop zone is a sparsely populated
setting. This is typical of a humanitarian supply drop area selected to be near a
city, but not in the city. Figure 8 shows the scene we have defined with (shaded)
elements to be avoided and the optimal drop location and angle found (the series of
circles). Throughout this paper, the sizes of the elements shown in the drop scene
are to scale, while the sizes of the circles are proportional (but not to scale) to the
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magnitude of the standard deviations of drop errors. Let us discuss setting up and
solving this example in detail.
Figure 8: Scenario Layout with Optimal Aiming Location
We have chosen to characterize the search space as 1000 x 1000 meters with
100 (10 x 10) grid zones 100 m by 100 m, with the requirement that the middle
of the bundle object lands at least 200 m from the edge. Keeping the size of the
search space small is important, both because it determines the magnitude of the
optimization problem and it bounds the area where the recovery team will have to
travel to acquire the dropped supplies.
In this base problem, an airdrop plane traveling at 120 meters/second drops
objects 0.5 seconds apart. This yields a distance between the bundle objects of
60 meters so that with ten objects dropped there is a total path length of 540 m.
The drop technology involved has standard deviations of 100 m in both the x and
y direction (typical values across the types of airplanes and chute types that AMC
uses). Figure 9 collects this data together and is actually the format of an input
screen for our solution program.
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Figure 9: Input Parameter Table
The collateral objects, and their avoidance values, are entered via another ta-
ble. Figure 10 contains the data for our base problem with 20 collateral objects. For
the purposes of this paper, collateral objects are taken to be rectangular facing the
axes of the coordinate system. (As an aside, circular buildings are well represented
by a square.) Complex shapes can be built with several rectangles. A larger object
could in fact be a cluster of buildings. This scenario intentionally includes a variety
of objects with lengths and widths between 10 and 100 meters. We are envisioning
every collateral object as being occupied housing with equal avoidance value. Of
course if an object is known to be just a barn, its value could be decreased.
Note that we have chosen to use a coordinate system of the cardinal directions.
This is not required but it makes planning with maps, GPS, or satellite imagery easier
and, regardless, the solution algorithm picks its optimal angle in terms of whatever
coordinate system is selected.
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Figure 10: Collateral Objects
In terms of solution, collateral objects and their values determine the more
attractive drop paths and locations. Figure 8 shows the true optimal solution in
this scenario. Unsurprisingly, the optimal aiming location for the bundles lies in the
rather large gap in the buildings on the western side of the layout. Dropping in this
location yields a minimum objective function value of 0.088 which means that, in
an individual bundle drop, an average of only 0.088 collateral objects will be struck
(since each object has a value of 1) by the ten bundle objects. Note that there is a
small chance that some of them may be struck more than once.
2.3.3 Solution Methods. In this section, we undertake a series of studies
comparing, combining, and evaluating the global search methods of Section 2.2 to
solve the formulation of Section 2.3.1 for problems of the type in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.3.1 Surrogate Functions. Regardless of the search approach used,
calculations of the cost function are computationally expensive since there must be a
complicated integral computed at each point on the grid that lies within a collateral
object. Surrogate functions are routinely used in evolutionary algorithms when the
cost function is complicated and requires a large amount of processing time. This
is the case for the multiple integrations of the bivariate normal distribution for
the airdrop collateral damage problem. To combat this, for the first number of
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generations of differential evolution we will use a surrogate function which requires
less processing time. The key, however, is to find the correct number of generations
at which to make the switch between using the surrogate cost function and the actual
cost function. Using the surrogate cost function too long will result in convergence to
a sub-optimal solution (a solution that is optimal for the surrogate function, but not
the true cost function). Switching to the actual cost function too soon will negate
the time savings gained by using the surrogate cost function.
The surrogate function created for the integration of the bivariate normal dis-
tribution will be based on an approximation of its probability density function (pdf).
By experimentation, we find that just four rectangular prisms approximate this pdf
adequately. Figure 11 shows graphically the normal distribution approximation used
for the surrogate function.
Figure 11: Surrogate Approximation of the Normal Distribution
As evidence of the accuracy of the 4-point surrogate, Figure 12 compares the
objective function value of the surrogate normal to the actual probability value
for over 10,000 bundle object and collateral object impacts. The graph shows low
error and high correlation (0.894) between the two functions. The speed-up of the
surrogate does not deter the accuracy of the search to optimum.
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Figure 12: Surrogate versus Actual Objective Function
2.3.3.2 Differential Evolution Algorithm. We have implemented the
differential evolution method described in Section 2.2.3 and Figure 13 created by
Storn and Price [94]. The differential evolution algorithm has as its key inputs the
number of generations and the number of solutions within the generations. After a
series of trials we find the following constants for the differential algorithm provided
convergence to one solution while keeping the run time for the algorithm low: F =
0.8, CR = 0.5, NP = 40, and generations = 100. This means there are 4,000 separate
calculations of the objective function.
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Figure 13: Differential Evolution Algorithm
2.3.3.3 Differential Evolution with Surrogate. We have implemented
two variations of the Differential Evolution algorithm where the surrogate function is
used to speed up the process. In the first variation, the initial 50% of the generations
use the surrogate function, and in the second the surrogate function is used in 100%
of the generations. Once the final generation of solutions is obtained, those locations
have their true objective function values calculated and then compared in order to
determine the best solution. Random starting points within the user-defined grid
initialize both algorithms.
2.3.3.4 Response Surface Algorithm. For the response surface al-
gorithm, the solution space is initially searched in order to find good candidate
solutions. This step is accomplished by uniformly searching the solution space, find-
ing the best ten solutions and then using these ten solutions as inputs to the second
phase of the algorithm. The second stage takes each of these ten solutions and then
determines the regression equation about each solution. From there (again, for each
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solution) movement is made in the direction of the steepest descent by a given step
size. Those new ten solutions then become the inputs and the process is repeated
with smaller step sizes, for a given number of iterations. Finally, the ten result-
ing solutions are compared to determine the best solution. For the response surface
method in our base problem scenario, for example, there were 7*7*35 + 2*2*3*10*10
= 2915 separate calculations of the cost function computed.
Once the ten best solution vectors from enumeration are found, each solution
is treated as the starting point and the algorithm in Figure 14 is performed:
Figure 14: Response Surface Methodology Algorithm
2.3.3.5 Response Surface Methodology with Surrogate. We have also
programmed the response surface algorithm with surrogate method using the sur-
rogate objective function to perform the enumeration step before switching to the
true objective function for the response surface portion. Thus, the best ten solutions
from the surrogate objective function are found and on these solutions the response
surface algorithm is performed (using the true objective function), giving movement
towards better solutions moving from these ten solutions for a series of iterations.
Examples of the search movement are shown in Figure 15. Starting points are at
the grid intersections and the points are the midpoint of the bundle drop. This
figure shows the unique nature of search evolution in our problem wherein the angle
changes during the search and not merely the location.
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Figure 15: Steepest Descent Movement in RSM
2.3.3.6 Enumeration. One might ask, why not simply evaluate at
many points in the drop area and pick the best one of those as the estimate of the
global optimum? The problem is computational effort - when searching the entire
solution space in an enumerative manner, the size of the steps taken has a significant
effect on both the optimal solution found and the number of trials necessary to
find the optimal solution. As the step size approaches zero, the number of trials
approaches infinity at a rate inversely proportional to the cube of the step size (since
this is a three-dimensional problem). Additionally, as the step size approaches zero,
the solution found approaches the true optimal solution for the scenario. Figure 16
shows, in fact, this tradeoff in our base scenario problem. Enumeration can, in fact,
find the optimal solution of 0.088. The problem is that, for our example, it requires
673,501 computations of the objective function.
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Figure 16: Optimal Result and Calculations vs. Step Size
Nevertheless, enumeration offers a comparison value in terms of accuracy and
speed. We have gone so far as to implement enumeration with the surrogate tech-
nique. We will also evaluate the behavior of enumeration on a coarser grid.
2.4 Global Search Results
In this section, we compare all of the algorithms introduced in this paper. The
merit metrics are running time and accuracy. The results are all solutions to the base
scenario of Section 2.3.2; however our computational experience leads us to believe
that the relative performance of the algorithms is the same on other problems of our
type.
In addition, we investigate the behavior of solutions for a wide range of scenario
variations that a planner might face. This serves the purpose of validating our
work and, more importantly, reveals tradeoffs and improvement methods that we
consistently find.
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2.4.1 Comparison of Search Algorithms. Figure 17 collects the results of
our algorithm comparison studies. As discussed earlier, there are three DE algo-
rithms, three enumeration algorithms, and two RSM algorithms. Let us first look
within the algorithm types and then across them.
The DE algorithm consistently finds (and should by its design) the best solution
because it is defined in terms of the true objective function. Surrogacy speeds the
calculation up, but the quality of the solution can suffer.
The enumeration algorithm benefits the most from surrogacy because of the
high number of objective function evaluations required. Trying to improve compu-
tational time by using a coarser grid does not work as the solution quality inevitably
suffers. This is the behavior we saw in Figure 16.
The RSM algorithm produces high quality results but has the limitation of
always approximating the true objective function. This is compounded by the sur-
rogacy approximation. With that said, RSM still produces good quality solutions
consistently in a reasonable time.
Figure 17: Summary of Results for Techniques
Figure 18 summarizes the computational cost versus solution accuracy of the
algorithms. Computational cost is calculated as the number of calculations of the
true objective function plus 25% of the number of calculations of the surrogate
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function (that being the approximate savings). The lower left corner of Figure 18 is
the most desired having a low calculation time and a low optimal solution value. The
computationally-intensive method of enumeration is dominated and is not the way
to approach solving this class of problem. The remaining Pareto optimal approaches
then are differential evolution, response surface method using the surrogate function,
and the differential evolution method using only the surrogate function.
Figure 18: Results of Various Methods
We feel that, although it is fast, the DE with 100% surrogate gives away too
much in terms of accuracy. Either of the other two Pareto methods is a good choice,
depending on the tradeoff for the planner in terms of speed versus accuracy. For
example, using a 2.7 GHz desktop PC with 4.0 GB RAM, we obtain solutions to the
base problem in a few minutes of clock time. So, choosing pure DE might mean an
8 minute response time versus a 2 minute response for RSM with surrogate (whose
solution might be 1-2% worse). For accuracy, and consistency of comparison, we use
DE for all the remaining case studies in this paper.
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2.4.2 Guidelines to Airdrop Planners. In this section, we solve fourteen
variations of a new airdrop problem (Scenario #1 below) using the techniques de-
veloped in this paper to explore the effects of changing inputs (the drop technology,
the scene itself, etc.). The variations represent real-world situations that an airdrop
planner might face.
Choosing bundle configurations:
• Using bundles of size five rather than ten. This investigates the impact of two
missions of five versus one mission with a size ten bundle (Scenario #2).
• Using a bundle separation distance of 30 meters rather than 60 meters. This
shows the benefit of a plane traveling slower over the dropzone (#3).
Choosing drop technology (the standard deviation values were taken from Figure 6):
• Using higher (#4), lower (#5), and unequal standard deviations (#6) to gener-
ally underscore the effects of accuracy in delivery systems on collateral damage.
• Specifically using an LCLA chute at 1000 feet (the lowest standard deviations
of all chute-altitude combinations) (#7).
• Specifically using an LV chute at 3000 feet (the highest standard deviations of
all chute-altitude combinations) (#8).
• Specifically using an LV chute at 1000 feet (the most common chute-altitude
combination) (#9).
• Specifically using an HV chute at 2000 feet (the most common HV altitude)
(#10).
Effect of changes in the nature of collateral objects:
• Using differing values for the collateral objects rather than all collateral objects
having the same values. Collateral objects are randomly given values between
0 and 2 rather than the previous common value of 1 (#11).
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• Using smaller collateral objects ranging from 10 x 10 meters to only 30 x 30
meters rather than up to 100 x 100 meters. This demonstrates the benefit of
more accurate intelligence on the nature of the collateral objects in the drop
scene (#12).
• Using ten collateral objects in the scene rather than twenty demonstrating the
benefit of moving to more sparsely populated areas (#13).
Consequences of limitations in travel over the drop scene:
• Using a flying angle constraint (this is the “as desired” constraint in our formu-
lation). This demonstrates that weather, terrain, or other safety flying logistics
can have detrimental consequences on drop risk. (#14)
The inputs and results for all scenarios are presented in Figure 19, wherein the
last column is the damage value at optimum (lower is better). Like scenarios are
grouped together.
Figure 19: Summary of Results for Scenarios
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Figure 19 demonstrates that cutting the standard deviation in half from 100
meters (#1) to 50 meters (#5) lowers the expected amount of collateral damage risk
by 93%, underscoring the need for accurate delivery systems. The vast improvement
possible by a technologically-advanced delivery system can be seen in the near-zero
damage caused when using the LCLA chute type from 1000 feet (#7). Conversely,
the LV chute type from 3000’ (#8), with its large standard deviations has a collateral
damage risk 61% higher than the standard case (#1).
Figure 19 also shows the sharp decline in expected damage from lowering the
number of collateral objects (#13) or decreasing the size of collateral objects (#12).
This is to be expected (and quantified by our model). It is more surprising, that a
50% decrease in the separation (#3) from flying slower yields only a small decrease
in expected collateral damage (25%).
Let us turn from the optimum values of the objective function to the changes
in the location and angle of drop. Figures 20 through 26 depict the optimal aiming
locations and angles from Figure 19 for all fourteen scenarios:
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Figure 20: Varying Bundles - #1, 2, 3
Figure 21: Varying Standard Deviation - #1, 4, 5, 6
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Figure 22: Chute Type - Altitude - #7, 8, 9, 10
Figure 23: Varying Collateral Values - #1, 11
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Figure 24: Smaller Collateral Objects - #12
Figure 25: Fewer Collateral Objects - #13
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Figure 26: Constrained Flying Angle - #14
• While any change in the inputs may result in a vastly different area of the
grid in which to drop, in the examples chosen we see that fewer bundles (#2),
smaller bundle separation (#3), or smaller collateral objects (#12) did not
greatly move the aimpoint from the standard case (#1).
• Changing the standard deviations (#4, 5, 6) not only has a tremendous effect
on expected collateral damage, but can drastically change the location of the
optimal solution.
• Changing the values of the collateral objects (#11) has a major effect on op-
timal location. This is true even if the average collateral object value is the
same. Both the standard scenario (#1) and the varying value scenario (#11)
have average collateral object value of 1, yet #11 has a 34% lower objective
function value.
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• Decreasing the size of the collateral objects (#12) yields little movement in the
optimal aiming location from the standard case (#1), but over a 90% decrease
in the expected amount of collateral damage.
• Fewer collateral objects (#13) results in 50% less of the scene covered by collat-
eral objects and smaller collateral objects (#12) resulted in 89% less coverage
of the scene. However, fewer collateral objects results in less damage indicating
that it is better to have more collateral object area that is concentrated rather
than less collateral area that is spread out.
• The constrained angle scenario (#14) demonstrates the potential risk when
airdrop flight paths are restricted by weather, terrain, or other safety/logistics
concerns. In this scenario, the flight paths are constrained to be within ten
degrees of due north. From the standard scenario, we see a 29% increase in
the expected amount of collateral damage.
2.5 Results and Discussion
In this paper, we present a characterization of the distribution of supply air-
drops and methods for optimally dropping them. Specifically, supply airdrops follow
a bivariate normal distribution in which the x and y deviations are uncorrelated
(ρ = 0). A surrogate approximation function for the bivariate normal distribution
supports quick integration of the distribution to assess drop risk. RSM with surro-
gate, and DE, both return Pareto optimum results depending on a tradeoff between
runtime and accuracy. Both find near-optimal solutions of the non-linear program
resulting from the airdrop problem, quickly finding settings for both an airdrop
location and an approach angle. Enumeration is strongly dominated by all other
algorithms.
It is natural to ask whether an expert eye is a substitute for algorithms. It
turns out not. Suppose an airdrop planner who has been shown the oval shapes and
scales of a bundled set of a supply airdrop could predict the optimal aimpoint within
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50 meters in each direction and the drop angle within 5 degrees angle of the optimal
solution. Note that this is a high standard - we have looked at hundreds of combi-
nations of drops, yet still only approach that level of accuracy. In our base problem,
where the collateral objects have the same weighting, the planner “eyeballing” a
solution would have a collateral risk 14% higher than the optimum. In more com-
plicated scenarios where the collateral objects are weighted differently, “eyeballing”
a solution becomes much worse than the solutions found by our algorithms, with
“eyeballed” solutions routinely worse by 20% or more. A more reliable technique
must be implemented to limit damage and ensure recoverability.
In terms of future work, we have two ideas. First, rather than using bounds on
the x and y directions to limit the bundle drop zone, an attractor function could be
incorporated, which would approximate the likelihood of recovery as a distance from
a given point (typically the middle of the scene). The attractor function would be
weighted and added to the objective function for the problem. Second, automating
chute selection when not all missions would be able to use the most accurate types
of chutes has appeal. For example, in the case where an inventory of flights/chutes
is available to cover a set of drop zones, we would optimize not just the individual
drop but the portfolio of drops determining which chutes should be used for which
mission to minimize the overall risk of collateral damage.
58
III. Pareto-Optimality for Lethality and Collateral Risk in the
Airstrike Multi-Objective Problem
3.1 Introduction
Sources estimate that at least 6,000 to 9,000 civilian casualties [38] [98] [45]
have occurred in Afghanistan since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) as a direct result of Coalition military actions. More specific to the United
States Air Force (USAF), over 1,000 civilian deaths have occurred since the incep-
tion of GWOT due to air strikes [38]. In addition, property damage resulting from
airstrikes in Afghanistan to civilian-owned buildings has alienated some local resi-
dents and ruined goodwill created between NATO and anti-Taliban citizens [89].
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on No-Strike and the
Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Methodology from 2009 [25] gives the U.S.
Military its guidance on the subject of collateral damage. The document lays out
such things as which types of buildings/structures are typically parts of a no-strike
list and under which circumstances a commander may fire upon buildings known to
contain collateral objects or people. The document touches on the use of human
shields by the adversary, special restrictions on targets which may cause grave en-
vironmental or biological concerns, and the roles of personnel within the targeting
process.
Of primary importance, the Instruction provides the collateral damage method-
ology (CDM) process which seeks to be “simple and repeatable” in order to provide
“a reasonable determination of collateral damage inherent in weapons employment.”
CDM is presented in five levels of increasing risk of collateral damage. A target will
progress from level 1 until such point as it is no longer necessary to progress, thus
making the target (and associated collateral risk) categorized as either CDE Level
1-Low, 2-Low, 3-Low, 4-Low, 5-Low or 5-High. Within CDM, weapons (and their
method of employment) have assigned circular errors probable (CER) which give
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“a radius representing the largest collateral hazard distance for a given warhead,
weapon, or weapon class considering predetermined, acceptable collateral damage
thresholds that are established for each CDE level.” From the CER, a collateral
hazard area (CHA) is typically created by rotating this radius around the aimpoint
of a weapon to create a circle. Collateral objects falling within that CHA for a
given CDE level cause the target to be elevated into the next higher CDE level for
further evaluation, until finally a CHA is created with no collateral objects within
its boundaries, or the rating of CDE level 5-High is given to the target.
The CERs for given weapons and methods of employment only spell out the
radius outside of which a collateral object should be safe from the weapon’s firepower.
This approach to the estimation of a weapon’s power is known as the “cookie-cutter”
approach, whereby all objects falling within the radius are considered to be destroyed
and all targets falling outside of the radius are 100% safe. While simple and easy
to implement, this assumption can be detrimental in the planning process for a
weapons strike. The distribution, and not just the lethal range, of the weapon has a
significant effect on the choice of an optimal aiming location and weapon selection.
This paper seeks to quantify the effects of different weapon damage functions along
with the effect of improvements made to the current policy guiding collateral damage
mitigation.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Collateral Damage Estimation. In the literature the probability of






p(x, y) · d(x, y)dydx (10)
where
P - probability that the point target is destroyed,
p(x, y) - probability density function of the weapon’s impact point,
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d(x, y) - probability that the point target is destroyed given that the weapon impacts
at point (x, y).
In Equation 10 we indicate that lethality at a particular point (x, y) in space
is both a factor of the uncertainty of the landing location (p(x, y)) and the damage
caused at a given point in the case that it lands at a particular point in space (d(x, y)).
Therefore, collateral damage estimations can be made by knowing the location error
function and the damage function for the particular weapon.








µx - x-coordinate of aimpoint,
µy - y-coordinate of aimpoint,
σ - standard deviation of the miss distance for the weapon.
This formula is the bivariate normal distribution, where the x and y miss
distances are both uncorrelated (ρ = 0) and the distributions in both the x and y
directions are identical (that is σ = σx = σy) [29]. To account for situations where
the miss distances in the x and y directions are different (σx 6= σy), yet uncorrelated,













For uncorrelated miss distances in the x and y directions (ρ 6= 0) we must use


















A variety of damage functions are used for a variety of reasons, such as simplic-
ity, accuracy in modeling the data, and ease of computation. Additionally, different
types of air-to-ground weapons will have differing patterns of damage. The uniting
characteristics of these functions is that they are decreasing functions as the radius
(distance from point of impact) increases, their integral
∫∞
0
d(r)dr is bounded, and
they are “well-behaved” [64], meaning that either there exists a radius R such that
for all r > R, d(r) = 0, or their function is continuous and monotonic.
Cookie-Cutter: d1(r) =
1, r ≤ LR0, r > LR (14)
Gaussian: d2(r) = e
−r2/2b21 (15)
Exponential: d3(r) = e
r/b2 (16)




The continuous damage functions come from 1-CDF of the probability func-
tions (e.g. the exponential distribution which has a PDF of f(r, b2) =
b2e
−b2r, r ≥ 0
0, r < 0
,
yields a CDF of F (r, b2) =
1− e
−b2r, r ≥ 0
0, r < 0
, which in turn creates the damage




d(r)dr [64], thus in order to get a realistic comparison between
damage functions, we must ensure that the lethal ranges using each of the damage
functions is the same, therefore making it necessary to tweak the constants in the
functions. For the exponential damage function b2 is exactly equal to the lethal
range of the weapon since
∫∞
0
d3(r)dr = b2. In the Gaussian damage formula the
value for b1 can be shown to equal LR×
√
2/π. As noted in [82], since the lognormal
damage formula has two inputs (α, β) there is no unique setting for the inputs to
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give a certain lethal range. For example, in Figure 27, the settings for the lognormal
damage function are α = 0.615 and β = 1, which can be found using the graph in
Figure 27 for LR = 1. The PDF for each of the damage functions with a lethal range
of 1 are depicted in Figure 28.
Figure 27: Lognormal Damage Function Inputs for Desired Lethal Range
Figure 28: Damage Functions (LR=1)
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3.2.2 Lethality Functions. Combining the damage function with the loca-
tion error function (with the assumption of ρ = 0 and σx = σy) yields the following
lethality function which is the expected amount of damage at a given distance from




p(x, y, x′, y′)d(x, y)dydx (18)
By converting (x, y) into a distance r from (x′, y′), we can then inspect the
shape of the lethality functions based on the different damage functions d(x, y).
In the case where the standard deviations are 1 unit and the lethal range of the
weapon is 1 and 5 units, respectively, we generate the following graphs of the lethality
functions:
Figure 29: Lethality Functions (LR=1)
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Figure 30: Lethality Functions (LR=5)
Figures 29 and 30 give insight as to which functions over- or under-estimate
lethality and at which ranges. For example, in both graphs the cookie-cutter ap-
proach gives a higher result at the aimpoint (r = 0) than the other approaches.
This is particularly pronounced in Figure 30 where the cookie-cutter approach yields
lethality almost 75% higher than the lognormal and exponential damage functions at
a distance from the aimpoint of 3. This phenomenon will always be most pronounced
when the lethal range is high relative to the standard deviation of the miss distance
of the weapon (in these two examples, the standard deviation of the miss distance
for the weapon is 1). In the extreme case where the accuracy is degraded (yielding a
high standard deviation) then the cookie-cutter approach will yield a smaller value
at the aimpoint than the other approaches.
Lucas [64] goes into detail about the limiting behavior of each of the damage
functions, noting that the lethality of the cookie-cutter function drops off the fastest
when at higher distances from the aimpoint. This fact could be surmised from the
very quick drop of the cookie-cutter approach in Figure 29 and particularly in Fig-
ure 30. Further, Lucas [64] proves that the lognormal damage function has higher
lethality in its tail as r goes to infinity than any of the other damage functions, fol-
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lowed by the exponential, then the Gaussian, and finally the cookie-cutter approach,
which has the lowest lethality in its tail. These insights about the limiting behavior
of the lethality functions are irrespective of the accuracy of the weapon.
3.2.3 Offset Aiming. The concept of offset aiming is integral to the dis-
cussion of the minimization of collateral damage. Offset aiming is the concept that
directly targeting military objects is not always optimal. For example, if a mili-
tary target is located directly west of a collateral object (say, a school) and a given
weapon striking the military target directly with the chosen weapon would carry
enough force to significantly damage the school, then perhaps aiming slightly to the
west of the military object would be optimal. The weapon and its lethality function
might indicate that aiming 10 meters to the west of the military object would still
employ enough firepower to accomplish the military objectives while the extra ten
meters would put the school outside of the lethal range of the weapon, thus lowering
any negative effects on the school.
Offset aiming is already part of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) official
policy on collateral damage estimation and mitigation. However, offset aiming is not
considered until later levels of the CDE guidance. There is an argument to be made
that offset aiming should be considered at all levels of the CDE process.
3.2.4 Weapons Employment as a Multi-Objective Problem. The current
DoD policy on collateral damage indicates that collateral damage estimation must
be performed prior to any pre-planned air-to-ground strike. A commander must be
made aware of collateral risk in the area surrounding the military target and be
provided with detailed collateral damage estimation before giving orders to strike.
Efforts must be made to avoid collateral damage at a high cost, and the commander
then decides if the amount of collateral risk is worth the military value of striking
that target. Within CDE, differing weapons, aimpoints and methods of employment
are considered in an attempt to satisfy military objectives in the face of collateral
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risk. The two concepts, military objectives and collateral risk, are played off against
each other in order to create a mission plan that the commander is willing to support.
La Rock [57] discusses a multi-objective approach towards weapon implementation
taking into consideration collateral effects.
Typically, as the mission plan seeks to lower the collateral risk, the lethality on
the military target suffers. The converse is also true, as the lethality on the target
is sought to be increased, the risk to collateral objects in the area also increases.
The lethality functions mentioned in the previous section are the same for both
collateral objects and military targets; however, the goal is to minimize the lethality
on collateral objects and maximize the lethality on military targets.
3.3 Formulation
For a given damage function d(x, y) and a known delivery error function p(x, y),
we may begin to characterize the multi-objective function we seek to optimize for a
given scenario.
Goal: Max f1(x, y) (lethality on the military target) (19)















p(x, y, xi, yi)d(x, y)dydx





(x′, y′) - location of the military target
d(x, y) - damage function for weapon
n - number of collateral objects in the area of concern
(xi, yi) - location of the i
th collateral object
ci - value of the i
th collateral object
67
σ - standard deviation of weapon miss distance
Damage function specific inputs
α, β - lognormal damage function
b1 - exponential damage function
b2 - Gaussian damage function
LR - cookie-cutter damage function
The values of the collateral objects are typically subjective based on the desire
to avoid striking them. The higher the value the more concern the planners have for
avoiding this structure/area. The inputs to the lethality function are the lethal range
of the weapon, the damage function to be used (along with choices of either alpha
or beta for the lognormal function), and the accuracy of the weapon (the standard
deviation of the miss distance).
3.3.1 Goal Programming Formulation. Once offset aiming is introduced
to achieve collateral damage mitigation, a goal-programming approach can then
be employed to get an accurate comparison between the damage functions’ effect
on both lethality and collateral damage. For instance, we could stipulate that the
lethality on the military target must be above a certain number, say 90%. If this were
our assumption, then our secondary goal would be to then find the point that satisfies
this requirement while trying to minimize the collateral damage. We will call this
approach the lethality first approach, or in this case the 90% lethality first approach.
Conversely, if we wanted to use a constraint of no more than 10% collateral risk,
we would start by eliminating all aimpoints that don’t first satisfy this constraint.
From there, we would then search the space that maximizes lethality on the military
target; this will be the collateral first approach.
If we can turn either of the two objective functions into a constraint, then this
problem is simply a single objective non-linear objective problem with an additional
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constraint from the other objective. There will now be just a single solution (in our
case, a single point (x, y) in the scenario) which optimizes our objective.
The new formulation for the collateral first approach becomes:
Goal: Max f1(x, y) (20)
subject to: f2(x, y) ≤ c
For the lethality first approach the formulation becomes:
Goal: Min f2(x, y) (21)
subject to: f1(x, y) ≥ c
with the same constraints and definitions from Equation 20. In cases where the miss
distance standard deviations in the x and y directions are the same, then f1 will
have the same value for all points which are the same distance from the location of
the military target. Therefore, f1(x, y) can be thought of as f1(r) where r is the
distance from the point (x, y) to the location of the military target (x′, y′). That is,
f1 is symmetric about the location (x
′, y′).
Solution techniques for solving non-linear programs such as response surface
methodology and evolutionary algorithms are logical candidates. To further charac-
terize our objective function, we observe that it is continuous, since each of the lethal-
ity functions are continuous (even the cookie-cutter lethality function). Therefore,
non-linear optimization techniques which rely upon a continuous function should be
tried, while techniques which are more suitable for discontinuous functions are less
logical (such as tabu search, branch-and-bound, etc.)
3.3.2 Weighted Sum Scalarization. In a similar vein, to convert multi-
objective optimization problems into single objective optimization problems, weights
can be given to the multiple objective functions. In this case, the sum of the weighted
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function values is calculated in an effort to minimize (or maximize) the total. In our
problem, since we seek to maximize lethality (f1) and minimize collateral risk (f2),
then opposite signs are given to the two functions:
Goal: Max w1f1(x, y)− w2f2(x, y) (22)
subject to: w1 + w2 = 1
The weighted sum scalarization approach presents a decision analysis problem
since now we must construct weights for the value of collateral objects relative to
the value of increased lethality on the military target. Of important note is that
any solution to the weighted sum scalarization approach or any solution to the goal-
programming approach will be a point on the Pareto front for the problem.
3.3.3 Multi-Objective Formulation. If we choose not to employ either
goal-programming or weighted sum scalarization as a technique to combine the two
objective functions into a single objective function (or a single objective function
with an added constraint), then we can use a multi-objective optimization approach.
When there is more than one objective function, there are (often) infinitely many
solutions that lie on the Pareto front for the particular problem. Assuming that all
objective functions attempt to minimize the response, the Pareto front is the set of
solutions (x′, y′) such that there exists no other solution (x, y) for which fk(x
′, y′) ≤
fk(x, y) for all k from 1 to the number of objective functions and fk(x
′, y′) < fk(x, y)
for at least one value of k. These points in the Pareto front are non-dominated by
any other solution.
Algorithms to identify the entirety of the Pareto front are difficult to find,
especially for problems where the objective functions are complex, such as in the
collateral damage airstrike minimization problem. The majority of the literature on
solving multi-objective optimization problems depends on evolutionary algorithms
[19]. For instance, differential evolution approaches [2] [107] [104] [9] use mutation
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and combination methods developed for a single objective algorithm by Storn and
Price [94]. We will compare the differential evolution algorithm of [2] against the
algorithm we created to solve our multi-objective problem in the following section.
3.4 Methodology
In this section we will compare a differential evolution algorithm to a radius-
based search method that leverages off the nature of the airstrike multi-objective
formulation. The radius-based search method is shown to run in a fraction of the
time of a differential evolution algorithm and produce better results. This radius-
based search algorithm relies on the fact that with only a single military target in
the region of interest, we can express the lethality function f1 in terms of only the
distance from the target. Thus, any point that is Pareto optimal must have the
lowest collateral risk for all points the same distance from the target. The converse
is not true; that is, a point which has the lowest collateral risk for all points the same
distance from the target is not guaranteed to be Pareto optimal.
Further, while not guaranteed that all Pareto optimal solutions lay on a con-
tinuous line, in practice, we find that this is the case in nearly all scenarios. Since we
are guaranteed the strictly decreasing nature of the lethality functions (regardless
of their underlying damage functions), the location of the target is a Pareto opti-
mal solution. Therefore, the continuous line emanates from the target location and
extends to the edge of the scene. This is consistent with the graphs of the Pareto
optimal solutions in the figures earlier in this section.
Figure 31 shows our radius-based solution algorithm which accurately estimates
the Pareto front and Pareto optimal solutions.
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Figure 31: Radius-Based Search Algorithm
3.4.1 Prototype Problem. Using the formulation laid out in the previous
section, we may now begin to picture what the objective functions look like over
the range of possible solutions. For the examples in this section, we will use the
assumption that the scene is a 100 meter by 100 meter square. There is a single
military target in each scene along with a number of equally weighted collateral
objects that we seek to avoid damaging. With a miss distance standard deviation
and a lethal range provided for the weapon used, contour plots can be developed for
each of the damage functions. From these contour plots, it is very easy to identify
where both the military targets and collateral objects are located within the scene
(each of the contour plots is based on the same scenario). Figures 32 and 33 show
the lethality functions and the collateral objects for our prototype problem.
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Figure 32: Lethality Function
Figure 33: Location of Collateral Objects
To help visualize the nature of solutions, Figures 34 - 37 plot the two objective
functions for the prototype problem using the four different damage functions (the
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lethality function is on the left and the collateral risk function is on the right).
The cookie-cutter damage function (in Figure 36) shows the fastest drop-off of any
of the damage functions yielding more distinct humps in the collateral risk graph
surrounding the twenty collateral objects. Contrast this with the exponential damage
function collateral risk graph (Figure 35) where the humps surrounding the collateral
objects are much more blurred as a result of a more gradual decline in the lethality
function for the exponential. The lognormal and Gaussian damage function graphs
fall between the two extremes of the exponential and cookie-cutter graphs.
Figure 34: Gaussian Damage Function
Figure 35: Exponential Damage Function
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Figure 36: Cookie-Cutter Damage Function
Figure 37: Lognormal Damage Function
Using enumeration (finding the lethality and collateral risk at a very fine resolu-
tion, 1000x1000, in the solution space), we find the non-dominated points. Figures 38
- 41 show the objective function values for all points in the scene (sampled every me-
ter in the x- and y-directions) in the leftmost graphs with the higher lethality on the
left edge and the lower collateral risk on the lower edge. The middle graphs show the
non-dominated (Pareto-optimal) points in the objective space, which are those points
on the “southwest” edge of the left plots. These points are non-dominated since no
other point in this space has both a lethality value higher and a collateral value lower
than these points. The right graphs show the location of the non-dominated points
in the solution space.
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Figure 38: Gaussian Damage Function
Figure 39: Exponential Damage Function
Figure 40: Cookie-Cutter Damage Function
Figure 41: Lognormal Damage Function
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One may not be surprised to see that the location of the military target is
among the Pareto optimal points since no other point would have a higher lethal-
ity value than this point (due to the decreasing nature of the functions in Fig-
ure 29 and 30.) Keeping in mind that these functions were all tested with the
same lethal range, accuracy and scenario, the cookie-cutter function estimates much
higher lethality on the target and much lower collateral risk than the other dam-
age functions. The Gaussian function (Figure 38) demonstrates significantly higher
lethality on the target than the exponential and lognormal damage functions, but
the collateral risk among these three damage functions is fairly comparable.
In the next section, we undertake the comparison of the algorithms discussed
earlier and comparison metrics are introduced. The goal is to quickly and accurately
locate the Pareto optimal solutions.
3.4.2 Algorithm Performance. Zitzler et al. [106] present methods for
judging the effectiveness of algorithms for finding the Pareto front in multi-objective
optimization problems. The first metric (accuracy) measures the minimum distance
from the found solutions to a point on the true Pareto front (lower is better). The set
of solutions found in the objective space are Y ′ and the true Pareto optimal frontier







min{‖ a′ − ā ‖; ā ∈ Ȳ }. (23)
The second metric (diversity) measures the number of solutions found within a
distance of σ from each found solution. This indicates how distinct found solutions




|Y ′ − 1|
∑
a′∈Y ′
|{b′ ∈ Y ′; ‖ a′ − b′ ‖< σ}|. (24)
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The final metric (breadth) gives the maximum distance between found solu-
tions for each coordinate. As noted in [18], for a two dimensional problem such as






max{‖ a′i − b′i ‖; a′, b′ ∈ Y ′}. (25)
Using these metrics, we compare the radius-based algorithm to enumeration
and a differential evolution approach detailed in Figure 42.
Figure 42: Algorithm Performance (Prototype Problem)
Figure 42 compares the performance of our radius based search, a differential
evolution algorithm, and enumeration (best results in bold). The radius based al-
gorithm takes 37 minutes on a 2.60GHz machine to run, whereas the differential
evolution approach takes almost four hours and the enumeration approach takes
more than a week to compute. Our algorithm demonstrates the ability to generate
points close to the true Pareto front for the prototype problem for all four damage
functions as seen by the low values for metric 1. Metric 2, which measures the amount
of points in the objective space within 0.001 of each other yields mixed results, with
our algorithm generating the lowest totals for two of the four damage functions.
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Further, small changes to the algorithm, such as using a logarithmic growth of the
percentage value rather than linear growth, improve results for radius-based search
for this metric. Metric 3 shows comparable results for the algorithms; the results are
routinely within 5% of each other for a given damage function.
Figure 43 summarizes the metrics for 100 trials using our algorithm demon-
strating performance of the algorithm against a variety of scenarios (accuracy ranging
from 1 to 5 meters, lethal range varying from 5 to 20 meters, the number of collateral
objects between 20 and 30, locations of the collateral objects and military targets
varying within the 100m x 100m scene). These results confirm our algorithm’s per-
formance as seen in the prototype problem.
Figure 43: Metrics across 100 Radius-Based Trials
Now that we are able to quickly and accurately find a broad range of Pareto
optimal solutions for the true multi-objective formulation, finding solutions to both
the goal programming and weighted sum scalarization formulation becomes straight-
forward. Recall that solutions to weighted sum and goal programming are a subset
of the Pareto optimal solutions. Therefore, we must search only these solutions in
order to find optimal solutions to the other formulations. The radius-based search
gives us the location (x, y) and objective function values (f1, f2) for the optimal
solutions; therefore, testing just these to find an optimal aimpoint is as simple as
searching from among a small group of high quality solutions for the best values.
As long as the weights of the collateral objects are set to 1, the formulation
becomes:
Goal: Max w1f1(x, y)− w2f2(x, y) (26)
79
For example, using the Gaussian damage function, if we choose to value lethal-







from our Pareto optimal solutions yields a best solution of 0.1658 (f1 = 0.69, f2 =
1.41) located at (29.4, 72.6). This solution is found without having to reevaluate
the objective function. In a similar manner, assume we used a goal programming
approach where we seek the lowest collateral risk while having at least 50% lethality
on the military target for the same scene. We only need to find the Pareto optimal
point that is the lowest lethality above 0.50, and that is our solution to this goal-
programming problem. This point is located at (27.7, 77.6) with a collateral risk of
1.04 using the Gaussian damage function.
In the next section we will create Pareto front solutions for our airstrike problem
using our radius based algorithm. In particular we explore optimal solutions based
on different scenarios, guidelines and damage function in following sections.
3.5 Results
We first give a visual depiction of the effects of differing the damage function
and approach on the location of the optimal solution. The scenario is the same as
the one depicted in Section 3.4.1, with 20 collateral objects in a 100m x 100m scene.
In the Figure 44 we zoom in on the area around the military target (located at (30,
70)). The lethal range of the weapon is 10 meters and the accuracy is 5 meters.
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Figure 44: Location of Optimal Solutions
The effect of the two closest collateral objects (at points (32.4, 65.1) and (19.6,
68.1)) can be seen in Figure 44 as offsetting the optimal locations north of the military
target for all guidelines and damage functions. As the collateral constraint increases
it pushes the aimpoint away from the target and, similarly, as the lethality constraint
increases, the closer the optimal aimpoint becomes to the target (in Figure 44, we
show a lethality first constraint of 50% and a collateral first constraint of 50% for
comparison).
3.5.1 Effects of Differing Damage Functions. With the differing shape due
to the damage functions seen in Figure 28, the result using a zero offset distance with
a lethal range between 5 and 10 meters along with a standard deviation of the miss
distance of 5 meters and randomly generated collateral objects, we see the following
results for 100 trials:
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Figure 45: Comparison of Damage Functions
The cookie-cutter damage function which is used in CDE overstates lethality by
37% compared to the average of the other three damage functions and it understates
collateral risk by 51%. In the next section, we present a more general result.
3.5.2 Theoretical Collateral Function Values for Differing Damage Functions.
In a space where collateral objects are randomly located throughout an infinite
space, we are able to calculate the theoretical collateral function values for the dif-
ferent damage functions if we know the number of objects per unit of planar space.
By rotating the lethality function around the x-axis and multiplying by the num-






When looking at the theoretical value for each damage function, we can see
how the damage functions will give wildly different collateral risk values. E[f2cc ] ≤
E[f2g ] ≤ E[f2e ] regardless of the accuracy and lethal range of the weapon in a
randomly generated infinitely large scene.
That is, the expected collateral risk for the cookie-cutter damage function will
always be less than the Gaussian damage function which will be less than using the
exponential damage function (proof in Appendix A). The collateral risks for varying
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lethal ranges are shown in Figure 46, where the theorem is demonstrated for the
varying damage functions.
Figure 46: Collateral Risk by Damage Function
The values in Figure 47 summarize the collateral damage for twenty collateral
items within a 100m x 100m square along with the lethality at the aimpoint for the
various damage functions.
Figure 47: Expected Collateral Damage
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These results mirror the results of [64], which indicates that the lognormal
damage function gives a higher collateral risk value (and thus a longer stand-off
range) relative to the other damage functions and conversely the cookie-cutter func-
tion gives a lower collateral risk than the other damage functions and therefore a
shorter stand-off range.
3.5.3 Effects of Differing Guidelines. In this section we test another 100
randomly-generated real-world representative problems. Current policy allows for
no offset aiming, whereas the two other guidelines allow for offset aiming while using
either collateral risk or lethality as a constraint, as seen in Equation 21 and 22. We
test lethal range of 5 meters and accuracy of 1 meter using the cookie-cutter damage
function. Further, we assume that the lethality must be at least 0.8 for lethality first
and collateral risk must be no more than 0.2 for collateral first (results in Figure 48).
Figure 48: Results for σ = 1, LR = 1
The baseline methodology, which aims directly at the target, yields the highest
lethality. However, the collateral damage is, on average, 176% higher than for the
collateral first approach and 41% higher for the lethality first approach, with the
lethality being 26% and 14% higher versus the collateral first and lethality first
approaches, respectively.
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Figure 49: Location of Solutions
Figure 49 shows the location of solutions. The lethality first approach requires
an optimal location which is within four meters of the target location in order to
have at least 80% lethality on the target. This is not the case for the collateral first
approach, which can result in solutions very far from the military target in order
to find a location that falls below the 20% threshold for collateral risk (as seen in
Figure 49 where one of the optimal aimpoints is located at roughly (-25, -10) a
distance of almost 27 meters from the target).
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Figure 50: Lethality First vs. Collateral First
In Figure 50, we compare the lethality first and collateral first approaches
(using the Gaussian damage function) for varying levels, with the collateral con-
straint and lethality constraint ranging from 0.2 to 0.8 and differing lethal ranges
and standard deviations. In some scenarios, there are no locations which will yield
a collateral risk less than the constraint or lethality above the lethality constraint.
Thus, feasibility of solutions satisfying both goals is not assured. The trade-off also
introduces the idea of ordnance selection, the topic of the next section.
3.6 Ordnance Selection
Airstrike planners may have a variety of weapons as well as methods of em-
ployment (fusing, run-in, etc.) which affect the lethal range and accuracy. Thus,
to increase lethality and decrease collateral risk a planner must not only look for
the optimal aim-point but also the best selection of weapon and employment. For
instance, assume that in the same scenario in Figure 33, the planner was presented
with the following options of weapon and employment:
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Figure 51: Weapon/Employment Parameters
Let us assume that the damage function follows an exponential distribution.
The lethality/collateral risk trade-off values appear in Figure 52. From this figure,
we see the smaller, more accurate weapons yield a slightly lower lethality, but with
a large reduction in collateral risk (a 75% reduction in collateral risk with only a
10% reduction in lethality when moving from Weapon 1 to Weapon 4). While these
numbers will vary with the scenario and damage function, the take-away is that
smaller weapons provide nearly as much lethality as larger weapons, but with a
greatly reduced amount of collateral risk as long as the accuracy also improves with
the smaller weapon.
Figure 52: Weapon Lethality and Collateral Risk
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Moreover, assume that the mission planners would like to have 90% lethality
on a military target while minimizing collateral risk. If they had only weapons 1 and
4, only weapon 4 aimed close to the target would reach this goal and that would be
at a significant cost (collateral risk around 1.5). However, if they could fire multiple
weapons, perhaps they would choose firing two weapon 4’s, offsetting the weapons
to achieve a lethality just over 0.7 each (since 0.32 ≈ 0.1 yielding a 10% likelihood
of not destroying the target). This choice would yield a combined collateral risk of
under 0.4, over a 70% decrease in collateral risk from firing weapon 1.
Since planners will often be confronted with relatively few choices in terms of
weapons and employment options, then the evaluation of the collateral risk, lethality
and optimal aimpoint for each can be performed in an enumerative manner (this can
be accomplished in parallel if time is a concern). The search algorithms can be
used when either a clear goal is stated (e.g . minimize collateral risk while ensuring
90% lethality on the target) or when a variety of alternatives is available to the
decision-maker. It is, in fact, a straight-forward task to include weapon selection in
our formulation if desired.
3.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we develop a quick and accurate algorithm for accurately creating
the Pareto optimal frontier in the multi-objective airstrike problem. This algorithm,
which leverages specific attributes of lethality and collateral risk, is shown to rou-
tinely outperform differential evolution and enumeration algorithms. Once Pareto
optimal solutions are found these can be quickly converted to solutions to the as-
sociated goal-programming or weighted sum scalarization problems. The choice of
damage function is shown to greatly affect the expected lethality and collateral risk
in an airstrike underscoring the need for accurate estimation of weapons effects.
We demonstrate that the current methodology of not using offset aiming yields
lethality 26% higher at a cost of collateral risk 176% higher than a collateral first
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approach. The algorithm presented can be incorporated into the weapon (and em-
ployment) decisions facing an airstrike planner, who could alter selections based on
the minimum lethality needed or maximum collateral risk allowed to remedy the
limitation from non-offset targeting. Future work will see the application of our al-
gorithm to more complicated lethality and collateral risk models such as the JWS
and JMEM tools currently used by the USAF.
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IV. Look-Look-Shoot: Finite and Infinite Horizon Markov Decision
Policies with Limited Intelligence
4.1 Introduction
In fast moving troops-in-contact (TIC) situations, information is often subject
to the fog and friction of war. Forces cannot wait for perfect information and, as a
result, mistakes are made, civilians and even friendly forces are killed. However, the
alternative of waiting for “perfect” information before an airstrike is ordered has its
own set of consequences. Ground forces may be pinned down, and every second that
goes by increases their likelihood of being shot or killed by enemy forces. However,
there is a cost to making the wrong decision which could result in civilian casualties,
friendly force casualties and unnecessary collateral damage. The questions then
become, “How long do we wait for perfect information?” or “When have we received
enough imperfect information to make a decision?”
In these situations, there will always be a trade-off between the cost of civilian
casualties and the cost of losing friendly forces. There will be a cost of abandoning
friendly forces when they need help, there will be an opportunity cost of air support
spending time in an engagement that does not truly threaten them, and there will
be a cost of killing non-combatants.
4.1.1 Data Fusion. A goal of all observers in a conflict is to correctly
classify the nature of the suspected enemy in a timely manner (as time costs lives,
money, and the opportunity to support other engagements). In pre-planned missions,
where the nature and location of suspected enemy forces are well known, there have
been relatively few civilian casualties in recent years (only two pre-planned missions
resulted in civilian deaths from 2006 to 2007). Conversely, civilian casualties from
TIC situations have exploded in recent years (over 400 civilian deaths from TICs in
2006-07). TIC situations are defined by the lack of previous intelligence about the
90
suspected enemy, the location of friendly, neutral and enemy forces, the terrain, and
the capabilities of friendly and enemy forces.
In a TIC situation there may be a variety of observers attempting to determine
the true nature of the suspected hostile player. UAVs circling overhead sending
images of a building back to image analysts, ground forces in varying locations
relative to the suspected enemy, and air support pilots viewing the scene from above
will all give a unique picture of the battlespace. Each will have their own unique
assessment of the ground scenario, and we can assume that each of them has a
differing likelihood of being correct. In order to synthesize these perspectives the
field of data fusion must be introduced to the problem as we seek to get the most
correct information out of the imperfect data gathered from these sources.
Polikar [81] discusses the idea of ensemble based systems in decision making,
whereby diverse classifiers making individual classifications are fused together to
develop a cleaner picture of an unknown event. Polikar gives as an example a patient
undergoing tests for a neurological disorder, who might undergo an MRI scan, EEG,
blood and other tests. An individual test alone might give a prediction as to whether
the patient has the disorder or not, and each test has some type I and type II error
involved with it. The reason multiple tests are performed is that as the doctors get
varying pictures of the disorder, they will make a more robust classification yielding
lower type I and type II errors. We seek to give a framework for applying these same
ideas to TIC classification.
In the simplest case, the observers in a TIC are trying to determine if a building
or group of individuals constitute a legitimate military target. The suspected enemy
forces might truly have combatants among them, but often the multitude of civilians
(non-combatants) among them who would be put in danger with an airstrike could
outweigh the gain of killing the combatants. Recent military guidance has instructed
US personnel to exit situations in which non-combatant lives are in danger, even if
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it means disengaging with known enemy forces, if the personnel are able to safely
exit the environment [39].
4.1.2 Decision Making with Imperfect Information. All decision making
takes places without accurate or complete information on the outcome of the decision.
Often, with more time studying a decision, better information comes to light giving
the decision maker a better grasp of the true nature of the problem and the effects
of a decision [56] [85] [80]. While studying the time pressure on decision making,
Payne [79] notes, “In some cases, the longer the delay in making the decision, the
lower the expected return (value) from even the most accurate of decisions.” The
fact is that we cannot always afford to make an accurate decision, when doing so
delays making a “satisfactory” decision.
Decisions are routinely made in a sequential manner. Consider the stock mar-
ket, where once an investor purchases a stock, every following day, he may choose
whether to sell that stock he purchased, buy more of that stock he purchased, or
simply do nothing. Day after day, a decision is made, and the optimal decision pro-
cess is one in which the profit made on the investment is maximized at some point
in the future and the decision made on any given day depends on all of the decisions
leading up to that point (e.g. the investor cannot sell stock on a day if he sold all of
his stock the day prior).
The process of sequential decision making can be analyzed with dynamic pro-
gramming [31]. We can see the applicability of dynamic programming to TIC situa-
tions, where after receiving incremental information, a pilot may choose to either fire
upon a target, continue to loiter above a target or to leave the situation and attend
to other potential targets. However, as in the stock example, the pilot’s decision
depends on the decisions he has previously made. A target cannot be struck if it has
been previously struck (if we assume a strike completely destroys the target) and a
pilot cannot fire upon a target if his previous decision was to leave the scene. Just as
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with the investor, the pilot’s goal is to link together the chain of decisions which will
yield the best outcome at some defined future point. In order to find that decision
chain we must solve a dynamic program.
4.1.3 Dynamic Programming. Dynamic programming can be thought of
using stages and states. A stage is a discrete point in time at which a decision (uk) is
made based on the state (xk) of the system. The state is the summary of all decisions
from previous stages and their outcomes, due not only to the decisions made but
also the randomness (wk) involved with moving from stage to stage. Some additive
reward is gained for each decision made, and the goal is to maximize the sum of
the rewards over the time horizon of the problem. Bertsekas [13] lays out the main
ingredients of a basic dynamic programming formulation as:
1. A discrete-time system of the form xk+1 = fk(xk, uk, wk),
2. Independent random parameters,
3. A control constraint (decision),
4. An additive cost of the form EgN(xN) +
∑N−1
k=0 gk(xk, uk, wk),
5. Optimization over policies (rules for choosing uk for each k and each possible
value for xk).
Denardo [31] formulates the dynamic programming problem as xk+1 = fk(xk, uk, wk),
k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 where:
k indexes discrete time,
xk is the state of the system and summarizes past information that is relevant
for future optimization,
uk is the control or decision variable to be selected at time k,
wk is a random parameter,
N is the number of time control is applied.
For the Look-Look-Shoot (LLS) problem, we assume that each stage brings about
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more data relating to the problem assuming the pilot continues to loiter. The rewards
in this model are typically assumed to be costs, either the cost of a “look” decision
or the likelihood of being incorrect given a “leave” or “shoot” decision.
4.1.4 Markov Decision Process. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a
problem in which there is a decision maker, a finite number of policies or choices
the decision maker can choose, a transition probability matrix which defines the
likelihood of the next state given the current state and policy, a transition reward
matrix which indicates the current reward gained for the state and policy, and a
performance metric based on the rewards gained during the stages of the MDP [42].
S, a finite state space of possible system states. A realization of the random variable
S is denoted by s.
A, a finite set of actions. A realization of the random variable A is denoted by a.
An action a causes transitions from the current state to some new state.
T : S×A×S → R[0,1] is the state-transition function, giving the probability that the
agent transit to state s′ when it is in state s and takes action a. In other words, the
transitions specify how each of the actions and exogenous events change the state of




′|a, s) = 1.
R : S ×A→ R is the reward function giving the expected immediate reward gained
by the agent for taking each action in each state.
4.1.5 Partially Observable Markov Decision Process. When the agent is
unsure of the state s that he is currently in, unlike the MDP where the agent knows
where he is at all times, this problem becomes a POMDP. There is some probability
distribution around the state in which the agent thinks he is in (the belief state b).
O : S × A → Π(Ω) is the observation function, which gives, for each action
and resulting state, a probability distribution over possible observations (we write
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O(s′, a, o) for the probability of making observation o given that the agent took
action a and landed in state s′ [72].)
Monahan [72] introduces a system where one of three decisions may be made.
Either the observer can “inspect” - attempt to observe the true state of the target
another time (at a cost), “stop” - make a determination as to the true state of the
target and have no option for further observation, or “continue” in which he moves
to the next time interval (at a cost) where the same three options will again be
available to him. In the next time interval there is some probability that the nature
of the target has changed which is a difference from the assumptions in this paper.
McAllister [68] further notes, “While the Markovian property does not hold for the
state of the system, it does hold for the belief state of the system. The optimal policy
for any given stage is only dependent on the current belief state and not decisions
made in previous stages.”
4.1.5.1 Two-State Belief State. When trying to classify a suspected
target in a TIC situation, we are concerned with classifying the target as “legitimate”
or “illegitimate”, hence the two-state belief state (we believe, with some likelihood
that the target is “legitimate” or “illegitimate”). In a POMDP with a two-state
belief state, the likelihood of being in either of the two states can be expressed by
the belief (p) of being in one state or the other, since the likelihood of being in the
other state is 1− p. In Figure 53, the current belief state is expressed as p, which is
the observer’s belief that the true nature of the state is s1. As the observer becomes
more confident in s1 being the true nature of the state, then p will increase, and,
similarly, if the observer becomes more confident that s2 is the true nature of the
state then p will decrease (as s2 becomes the more likely true state). Thus, our belief
state can be written as b = (p, 1− p) yielding b(s1) = p and b(s2) = 1− p = q (note:
b(s1) + b(s2) = 1).
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Figure 53: Two-State Belief State
In a simple example, depicted in Figure 54, initially the observer believes that
the true state is equally likely to be in s1 or s2. The observer knows that each
observation has a 75% likelihood of being correct, thus, if he observes s1, then his
belief state is b = (0.75, 0.25) and if he observes s2, then his belief state becomes
b = (0.25, 0.75).
Figure 54: Belief State after First Observation
A complete policy for a POMDP is the optimal policy for each possible belief
state [50]. The optimal policy for a given stage is then only dependent on the
belief state at that stage and not decisions made during previous stages (the Markov
condition). Of particular note, a belief space may be partitioned into more regions
than actions, meaning that one action can be optimal for disparate regions of the
belief space [50] [73] [72].














s∈S T (s, a, s
′)b(s)] indicating that future belief
state is a function of both the current stage’s belief state, the action taken during
the current stage, and the observation made.
4.1.6 Shoot-Look-Shoot. Glazebrook and Washburn [41] present a review
of the “Shoot-Look-Shoot” problem in which a marksman is required to kill a given
number of targets. Once the marksman shoots, he looks to see if the target has been
killed, and then, if the target hasn’t been killed, he may choose to shoot again at
that same target. The problem gets further complicated by imperfect information
wherein the marksman may get possibly incorrect information as to the alive/dead
status of the previous target. Glazebrook and Washburn view the problem as a
Markov decision process and use a stochastic dynamic programming approach to
develop the marksman’s optimal strategy.
A difference between the “Look-Look-Shoot” problem and the “Shoot-Look-
Shoot” problem is that LLS allows for only one shooting. We assume that when
a target is aimed at, it is completely destroyed; battle damage assessment is not
implemented. In the LLS problem, imperfect information plays a role when the pilot
is unsure whether a target is a legitimate military target or not.
4.2 Finite Horizon
When viewing the LLS problem as having a finite horizon we allow for only a
given number of stages, at which time the TIC situation has been resolved, either
by firing upon the target or the air support leaving the situation. The finite horizon
problem lends itself to being solved through the dynamic programming method of
recursive fixing starting from the final time period and incrementally making decision
backwards. We implement this method in both cases where the quality (likelihood
of being correct) of information is constant across stages and where information
97
improves as we move through the stages as more surveillance and intelligence become
available in the TIC situation.
We will further assume that information arrives at set intervals each one unit
of time apart. The inputs to the problem then become: the information distribution
as a product of time, the cost of waiting one cycle for more information (cw), and the
cost of striking a building which is not a legitimate military target (cs). Further cw <
cs since otherwise there would never be an incentive to wait for more information also
the choices for action at each stage is either “L” (look, make another observation),
“S” (shoot, fire upon the target ending the scenario) or “X” (exit, leave the scenario
without firing). Note: only the “L” choice results in future stages.
4.2.1 Stationary Information. With a stationary information assumption,
information at each observation has the same probability of being correct. For exam-
ple, past observations in other TIC environments may point to correct classification
being 75%, where we assume an observer correctly classifies the target as “legitimate”
or “illegitimate” 75% of the time.
In the binary decision for stationary information such as determining the nature
of the target, the likelihood of correct classification depends only on the difference in
the number of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” observations made at a point in time.
For instance, if there are three out of five observations that result in a “legitimate”
determination, then the likelihood of this object truly being legitimate is exactly
the same as if two out of three observations yield “legitimate” calls. (In this case,
both have 0.5 observations above the 50% level.) The likelihood then of correct
classification is p2n/(p2n+q2n) where n is the number of observations above (or below)
50%. Clearly, as n approaches infinity, then the likelihood of correct classification
approaches 1.
Further, we can determine the likelihood of a future observation agreeing with
previous observations. In a simple case, assume that p = 0.75, what is the likeli-
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hood of the second observation agreeing with the first observation? The answer is
the likelihood that they are both wrong plus the likelihood they are both correct
(p2 + q2 = 0.752 + 0.252 = 0.625) and the likelihood that they disagree is then
1− 0.625 = 0.375. Moreover, if we know that the previous observations (regardless
of how many correct and incorrect observations have been made) yield a 0.75 proba-
bility of being correct, then the next observation will agree with the prior consensus
62.5% of the time and disagree 37.5%. We can further prove (see Appendix B)
that with information improvement over time, one would never shoot immediately
following an “illegitimate” call.
4.2.2 Improving Information. There are reasons to believe that the in-
formation gathered in successive stages will improve due to more intelligence assets
being placed in the scenario, whether in the form of more ground forces entering
the TIC scenario, more UAVs being moved into the environment or more air-to-
ground fighters joining the TIC. With this assumption, better information becoming
available will typically resolve the nature of the suspected target more quickly.
4.2.3 Recursive Fixing. In the finite horizon scenario for either stationary
or improved information, as the horizon stage (the last stage considered) increases
linearly the number of possible strategies increases exponentially. For instance, if
there is only one stage, then our choices are to “shoot” or “leave” depending on
whether the first observation is “legitimate” or “illegitimate”. That is, we could have
an optimal strategy of (S,S), (S,X), (X,S), or (S,S) for the two possible outcomes
of the observation. For the case where there are two observations made, we could
have many more strategies since now a strategy after the first observation may be to
look “L”, giving three possible actions after the first observation. Further, we add
another round of observations and decisions when making a second observation and
this grows the number of possible strategies exponentially as the stages increase (see
Figure 55), note that possible strategies equals 5n−1 where n is the horizon stage.
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Figure 55: Possible Strategies by Horizon
Again, we will assume that information arrives at set intervals each one unit
of time apart. The inputs will remain the information distribution as a product
of time, the cost of waiting one cycle for more information (cw), and the cost of
striking a building which is not a legitimate military target (cs). Let’s assume,
for example, that information follows the cumulative distribution function of the
geometric distribution with a probability of p. Thus, the likelihood of getting correct
information on the first look is p, on the second look it’s 1 − (1 − p)2 and on the
third look 1− (1− p)3 (that is, on the nth look the likelihood of correct information
is 1− (1− p)n). Further, we will assume that each look is independent of any other
look.
We will assume that our a priori assumption is that upon arrival at a TIC,
a target is equally likely to be legitimate or illegitimate. Further, if we assume a
finite horizon of only one look, then the problem is simple to solve if we assume that
a target is equally likely to be legitimate or illegitimate. If upon the first look the









then no strike should take place. In a similar manner, if the weapon is








indicates that a strike should still take place.
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With a finite time horizon and two looks, the problem is more complicated
since the two looks may yield different responses. For instance, the first look may
call the target “legitimate” and the second calls it “illegitimate”. By our assump-
tion the second look is more accurate but is mitigated by the first look yielding a
“legitimate” call. For simplicity, call the likelihood of correct information at the nth
look L(p, n), where L(p, n) = 1− (1− p)n and L′(p, n) = (1− p)n is the likelihood of
the nth look being incorrect. If both calls are “legitimate” then the likelihood of the
target being legitimate is L(p,1)L(p,2)
L(p,1)L(p,2)+L′(p,1)L′(p,2)
. If the first call is “legitimate” and
the second call is “illegitimate” then the likelihood of the first call being correct is
L(p,1)L′(p,2)
L(p,1)L′(p,2)+L′(p,1)L(p,2)
. Now, we begin to see the dynamic programming formulation
of the finite horizon LLS problem. The cost of waiting must not only include cw, but
must also include future expected costs of cw and cs.
If we consider “S” and “X” to be the same action (both of which end the
situation) then the finite horizon network with two observations looks like:
Figure 56: Two-Look Horizon
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Again, assume a two-look horizon where a target is equally likely to be le-
gitimate or illegitimate. We can then calculate the likelihood of a “legitimate” or
“illegitimate” call at each stage given previous calls. At look 1 (L1) the likelihood of
a “legitimate” call is 0.5. The likelihood of L2 being the same as L1 is p(1− q2) + q3
with the likelihood of being contradictory at 1− (p(1− q2) + q3). Further, the cost
of never shooting equals 2cw, the cost of waiting and then shooting being cw + pics,
and the cost of shooting immediately after the first look being pics. While cs and
cw are constant, pi (the probability of the target being illegitimate) changes as we
get more or different observations. For example, pi = q if we shoot after L1 returns
“legitimate”, however, pi = p if we shoot after L1 returns “illegitimate”. For the














If we assume p = 0.75, then L1 = L2 = “L” yields pi =
1
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whereas if L1 = “I”
and L2 = “L” results in pi =
1
6





would shoot after if L2 = “L”, if then one should shoot if L1 = L2 = “L”, and not
shoot otherwise. Determining, what to do after the first look is more complicated,
since we must incorporate the expected cost after the second look.
If L1 = “L” our cost will be:
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If L1 = “I”, then our cost will be cw + cw(p(1 − q2) + q3) + (1 − p(1 − q2) −























Figure 57: Two-Look Horizon Policy (p = 0.75)
4.3 Infinite Horizon with Stationary Information
The infinite horizon problem cannot be solved by recursive fixing since there
is no final stage. However, for stationary information, we can rely upon the Markov
attributes of the problem in order to recursively solve the TIC problem.
4.3.1 Building the Transition Matrix. In the stationary information case,
we are able to exploit the Markov nature of the problem since the likelihood of a
target being correctly identified as a friend or foe depends only on the difference in
the number of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” observations made up to that stage.
The state at a given time is identical to the belief state at that time, and not the
number of observations made to that point (this is not the case for improving infor-
mation). Further, we know the likelihood of the next observation being “legitimate”
or “illegitimate”. Let b be the belief state at a point in time, where b is the greater of
the probability that the target is “legitimate” or “illegitimate”, then the likelihood
that the next observation agrees with the prevailing belief is b ∗ p+ (1− b) ∗ (1− p).
As b grows larger, the likelihood of the next observation agreeing with the prevailing
belief increases (with a limit of p).
Therefore, we can make a transition matrix based on the belief state (expressed
in terms of the difference between the number of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” calls)
prior to the current stage (i.e. P1 may represent 5 “L”s and 4 “I”s or 1 “L” and 0
“I”s). From P1, for example, we can only move to P0 or P2. The transition matrix,
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· · · P−1,−1 P−1,0 P−1,1 · · ·
· · · P0,−1 P0,0 P0,1 · · ·










j=−∞ Pi,j = 1, i ∈ Z and Pi,j = 0 if |i− j| 6= 1.
If we choose to truncate the matrix at a given point (in this case, looking from
i and j from -3 to 3) and we insert the transition probabilities then the result is:
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥













0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0












0 0 0 0 0 0 ≈ 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(30)
Since Pi,j = P−i,−j we can convert the transition matrix to:
P =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
0 P0,1 0 0 0 · · ·
P1,0 0 P1,2 0 0 · · ·
0 P2,1 0 P2,3 0 · · ·




. . . . . . . . . . . .
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(31)
Now that we have described the transition matrix we can use it to guide the optimal
strategy determination. If the likelihood of incorrectly identifying the target as a
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legitimate target is below the cost of waiting divided by the cost of shooting at an
illegitimate target then we would always fire. That is, if pi = 1− pl < cw/cs then we
would fire upon the target.
By looking at the limiting behavior of the transition matrix (P (∞)), we then
can see the likelihood of the target truly being legitimate or illegitimate based on the
previous observations. Again, if we had only one observation and it was “legitimate”
then the likelihood of that target truly being legitimate is 0.75 (the same is true if
we had two “legitimate” calls and one “illegitimate” call). Thus the likelihood of
being correct based on the difference in the number of observations is
[
























0 · · · 0 q
p+q
0.5 0 · · · 0 0.5
q
p+q













If we cut off the number of observations above 50% necessary to make a definitive call
then the transition matrix becomes finite with two absorbing states (one for targets
deemed “illegitimate” and one for those deemed “legitimate”). This adjustment is





then we will fire, thus negating the need for further observations. Once we find the i





) is the optimal policy then we can recursively
find the optimal strategy for any i.
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4.3.2 Mean Time Spent in Transient States. Assuming we have found the
terminating state i, then we will determine the optimal policy recursively for state
i − 1, i − 2, and so on until reaching 0. To accomplish this we must know the
relative costs of actions in state i−1. In state i−1, we will know the cost associated
with the “S” or “X” action in state i, but we need to know the expected number
of observations necessary to reach state i from i − 1 (or the mean time spent in
transient states (0, 1, . . . , i− 1)) [85].
PT =















st1 st2 · · · stt
 (35)
S = I + PTS (36)
(I−PT )S = I
S = (I−PT )−1
Assuming i = 5, p = 0.75, then our S matrix would be:
S = (I−PT )−1 =

1.98 2.62 2.13 1.84 1.34
0.98 2.62 2.13 1.84 1.34
0.38 1.02 2.13 1.84 1.34
0.13 0.34 0.70 1.84 1.34




The S matrix shows that if we are in state i − 1 = 4, then we will need
0.03 + 0.09 + 0.18 + 0.47 + 1.34 = 2.11 more observations on average to reach the
absorbing state i where we know that the optimal strategy is “X” or “S”.
4.3.3 Constructing the Optimal Policy. Let si =
∑t
n=1 sin which indicates
the expected number of transitions from the ith state until reaching the terminating
state. If sicw >
qi
pi+qi
cs then the optimal policy would be to shoot upon reaching
state i. Further, since there is uncertainty still at the terminating state equal to
pt+1
pt+1+qt+1






cs the optimal policy is to shoot, in this
example p = 0.75, and the ratio of cw to cs is 0.01.
The infinite horizon scenario for the LLS can be mapped to the tiger problem
presented in [50], where the observer must choose between continuing to listen for a
tiger (at a small cost) or open a door revealing a tiger (or fortune) at a large cost or
reward. Once the observer’s belief state reaches a certain level of confidence, then
he would choose to open the door. This problem has a fairly simple structure for the
optimal decision policy, where the three choices are to open the left door, continue
to listen, and open the right door, are three non-overlapping segments of the [0,1]
belief state. As a reminder, though there may be only three possible decisions in
an POMDP, the number of ranges where one decision is optimal is infinite. The
challenge then is to determine the two points in the belief state where we move from
“leave” to “look” and from “look” to “shoot”. In the case where the cost of firing
upon an invalid target equals the cost of leaving when the target is valid, then the
two points are equal distances from 0 and 1 (i.e. the two points add to 1).
4.4 Results
Now that we can construct the optimal policy in the infinite horizon, stationary
information problem, we investigate the effects of the parameters of the problem on
the average time to make decisions and the average cost of a TIC situation.
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4.4.1 Effects of Intelligence on Decisions. In Figure 58 we view the effects
of intelligence accuracy on the observation difference necessary to make an “S” or
“X” decision. In this example, we assume that cw/cs is 0.01. We see that, as
one might expect, extremely accurate intelligence leads to a very small number of
observations necessary to make an “S” or “X” decision (in the case where p = 0.99,
we would immediately make an “S” or “X” determination). However, of interest,
is that extremely poor information, such as p = 0.5, results in a similar choice of
“S” or “X” after the first observation. This basically tells us that our information is
so unreliable, that waiting for more “bad” information will do us no good. We will
have no improved belief state with time.
Figure 58: Quality of Information vs. Observations
4.4.2 Effects of a priori Information on Decisions. Up to this point, the
assumption has been that the observer is equally likely to see either a valid or invalid
target. However, if, based on experience, historical evidence points to a different
ratio of valid to invalid targets then we can incorporate this into the model. A priori
information will have the same effect as previous observations would have. A priori
information will give the initial belief state of the system, whereas before, the initial
belief state was (0.5, 0.5), if the accuracy of the a priori information is pp, then our
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initial belief state will be (pp, 1−pp) or (1−pp, pp). The same technique of finding the
absorbing state and recursively setting the optimal policy will apply. The transition
matrix will reflect the a priori information where the entries to the left and right of
the diagonal are multiplied by 2pp and 2(1− pp) or vice versa.
4.4.3 Effects of Weights on Decisions. In Figure 59, we vary the ratio of cw
to cs from 0.1 to 1.0 to see the effect of the relative costs on our decision threshold.
As the cost of waiting decreases relative to the cost of either firing on an illegitimate
target or not firing on a legitimate target the number of observations necessary to
make a “S” or “X” determination increases.
Figure 59: Effect of Changing Costs
Further, we have assumed that the cost of shooting and the cost of leaving
(reaching the conclusion that the observer no longer waits) were equal. However, if
the cost of shooting and the cost of leaving were unequal, then the transition matrix
would have to be altered. Additionally, this would create two different levels for the
two absorbing states (the points where the observer would definitely leave the scene
or definitely fire upon the target).
109
The findings of this chapter are based on a multitude of assumptions in an
effort to keep this material unclassified. However, the sensitivity analyses provide
understanding of the various factors at play in these TIC situations.
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we have provided a framework for making optimal policy de-
cisions in fast-moving TIC situations where observers are unsure of the nature of
possible enemy forces in both finite horizon and infinite horizon problems. Through
the recursive technique of solving this Markov decision process we have demonstrated
the effect of improved intelligence and differing weights concerning waiting and mak-
ing incorrect decisions in the face of uncertain situations.
Future work involves creating heuristics for solving the TIC problem for the in-
finite horizon with improving information. In these situations, the Markov property
will not hold limiting the ability to apply many of the techniques in this paper. Addi-
tionally, making the problem more real-world reflective will lead to more complicated
cost and decision parameters.
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V. Summary, Future Work, and Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Original Contribution
In this dissertation, a characterization of the distribution of supply airdrops
and methods for optimally dropping them is presented. Specifically, supply air-
drops follow a bivariate normal distribution in which the x and y deviations are
uncorrelated (ρ = 0). A surrogate approximation function for the bivariate nor-
mal distribution supports quick integration of the distribution to assess drop risk.
RSM with surrogate, and DE, both return Pareto optimum results depending on a
tradeoff between runtime and accuracy. Both achieve near-optimal solutions of the
non-linear program resulting from the airdrop problem, quickly finding settings for
both airdrop location and approach angle. Enumeration is strongly dominated by
all other algorithms.
We suppose an airdrop planner who has been shown the oval shapes and scales
of a bundled set of a supply airdrop could predict the optimal aimpoint within 50
meters in each direction and the drop angle within 5 degrees angle of the optimal
solution. Note that this is a high standard - we have looked at hundreds of combi-
nations of drops, yet still only approach that level of accuracy. In our base problem,
where the collateral objects have the same weighting, the planner “eyeballing” a
solution would have a collateral risk 14% higher than the optimum. In more com-
plicated scenarios where the collateral objects are weighted differently, “eyeballing”
a solution becomes much worse than the solutions found by our algorithms, with
“eyeballed” solutions routinely worse by 20% or more. A more reliable technique
must be implemented to limit damage and ensure recoverability.
Additionally, a quick and accurate algorithm for accurately creating the Pareto
optimal frontier in the multi-objective airstrike problem is presented. This algorithm,
which leverages specific attributes of lethality and collateral risk, is shown to rou-
tinely outperform differential evolution and enumeration algorithms. Once Pareto
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optimal solutions are found these can be quickly converted to solutions to the as-
sociated goal-programming or weighted sum scalarization problems. The choice of
damage function is shown to greatly affect the expected lethality and collateral risk
in an airstrike underscoring the need for accurate estimation of weapons effects.
We demonstrate that the current methodology of not using offset aiming yields
lethality 26% higher at a cost of collateral risk 176% higher than a collateral first
approach. The algorithm presented can be incorporated into the weapon (and em-
ployment) decisions facing an airstrike planner, who could alter selections based on
the minimum lethality needed or maximum collateral risk allowed to remedy the
limitation from non-offset targeting.
Finally, we provide a framework for making optimal policy decisions in fast-
moving TIC situations where observers are unsure of the nature of possible enemy
forces in both finite horizon and infinite horizon problems. Through the recursive
technique of solving this Markov decision process we have demonstrated the effect of
improved intelligence and differing weights concerning waiting and making incorrect
decisions in the face of uncertain situations.
5.2 Future Work
The future work for the research presented in this dissertation will be modifying
the algorithms and theory to real-world software and application. Tools currently
in use by the USAF have more complicated inputs for both airdrop and airstrike
collateral estimates. While the tools being implemented today provide more accuracy
than the assumptions in this work, they all seem to lack the optimization step that
is necessary to truly lower collateral risk.
5.3 Conclusions
The importance of collateral damage minimization in U.S. engagements around
the world is undeniable. While steps have been taken to estimate collateral risks for
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airdrop and airstrike missions, there has been little done to minimize this collateral
risk efficiently. For airdrops, there is no tool available to find optimal locations
within a drop area to avoid collateral risk while ensuring recoverability, typically,
trained mission planners look for areas within a scene to make a drop. Results from
this work indicate that planners could be greatly aided by the work presented.
For airstrikes, offset aiming is a vital piece of mission planning, and one that
should be incorporated in the earliest stages of collateral damage estimation. Fur-
ther, the cookie-cutter damage function should be scrapped in favor of more repre-
sentative damage functions. While these functions may be more difficult to visualize,
the software packages available to mission planners should have no issues with han-
dling the more complicated distributions.
TIC scenarios present the greatest collateral risk and the most difficult type
of risk to lower. Improved intelligence gathering and an a priori understanding
of tradeoffs within a TIC have been shown to speed up decision-making in these
time-sensitive engagements.
Collateral damage and civilian deaths continue to plague U.S. missions world-
wide and attempts to minimize these risks are at the forefront of military leaders’
efforts. This dissertation presents important improvements in understanding the
source of collateral risk and steps which the U.S. military can take to minimize risk
while still ensuring mission success.
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Appendix A. Proof 1
THEOREM: The expected collateral risk in a randomly-generated infinitely-large
scene E[f2cc ] ≤ E[f2g ] ≤ E[f2e ] regardless of the accuracy and lethal range of the
weapon.
PROOF: Expected collateral risk is independent of accuracy when randomly aiming
by Formula 18. Additionally, by assumption, the lethal range for each damage func-
tion is equal, i.e. LR =
∫∞
0
dcc(r)dr = LR =
∫∞
0




Each pair-wise set of damage functions overlaps only once. For the cookie-cutter
and the Gaussian damage function, the functions only intersect at r = LR since
r < LR → dcc = 1 and r > LR → dcc = 0 and 0 < dg < 1, when r < LR then
dcc > dg when r > LR then dcc < dg. For the Gaussian and exponential functions,
the two functions cross only at the point r = 4LR
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rdc(r)dr, thus E[f2cc ] ≤ E[f2g ] ≤ E[f2c ].
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Appendix B. Proof 2
THEOREM: No optimal policy recommends firing after receiving an “illegitimate”
call when p > 0.5.
PROOF:
CASE I: Previous to the “illegitimate” call, there have been more “legitimate” calls
than “illegitimate” calls.
The “illegitimate” call would move the Markov decision process to a state
already visited in the scenario. Due to the Markov property, only the state currently
in (and not the path to that state) determines the policy for that state. If the optimal
policy at the new state is “shoot”, then the observer would have already shot when
at the state previously.
CASE II: Previous to the “illegitimate” call, there have not been more “legitimate”
calls than “illegitimate” calls.






) when there have been
i more “illegitimate” calls than “legitimate” calls, with i ≥ 0. With the likelihood of






meaning the likelihood of the target
being illegitimate is greater than the likelihood of the target being legitimate. Since
the cost of leaving a legitimate target equals the cost of firing at a illegitimate target,
then the cost of leaving the scenario ( q
i
pi+qi
cs) is lower (more optimal) than the cost




0-1-2-3 1 2 3-n n· · ·· · ·
Figure 60: Markov Transition Diagram
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high likelihood of successful recovery. A series of non-linear optimization algorithms is presented along with their relative
success in finding the optimal location in the airdrop problem. Additionally, we present a quick algorithm for accurately
creating the Pareto frontier in the multi-objective airstrike problem. We demonstrate the effect of differing guidelines,
damage functions, and weapon employment selection which significantly alter the location of the optimal aimpoint in this
targeting problem. Finally, we have provided a framework for making policy decisions in fast-moving troops-in-contact
situations where observers are unsure of the nature of possible enemy forces in both finite horizon and infinite horizon
problems. Through the recursive technique of solving this Markov decision process we have demonstrated the effect of
improved intelligence and differing weights for waiting and incorrect decisions in the face of uncertain situations.
Bivariate probability, non-linear optimization, multi-objective optimization, evolutionary algorithms, Markov decision
process
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